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Abstract - This thesis uses the historical setting of Amsterdam to investigate the presence of foreclosure 
discounts and the effect of foreclosures on neighboring properties. Based on a unique archival dataset with 
more than 164,000 transactions, I investigate foreclosure discounts, the time variation of foreclosure 
discounts and spillover effects via applying a cross-methodological approach from 1509 until 1811. This 
thesis exploits the high detail grade of the provided microdata to combine qualitative analysis of microdata 
with quantitative analysis based on a repeat sales methodology in a time period, with a unique foreclosure 
process. I find that the residential real estate market of Amsterdam has been very efficient, this might in 
part be explained by the reduced uncertainty of the Anglo-Dutch premium auction and the time-specific 
demand-supply dynamics that caused in wide parts of the sample a demand overhang. In terms of time 
variation, I find significant time variation of foreclosure discounts that seemingly are negatively correlated 
to the real estate cycle. A quantitative analysis of the relation between the real estate cycle and foreclosure 
discounts did not yield significant results, hence the relation remains subject to further research. 
Combining the microdata of the sample with a quantitative analysis I develop the hypothesis that this time 
variation might in part be driven by supply and demand relations but also by significant quality differences 
arising from changes in maintenance levels. I also investigate the spillover effects of foreclosures on 
neighboring properties, here I find significant spillover effects, that vary in terms of economic magnitude 
with street sizes. 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis analyses foreclosure discount in a historic setting, using the residential real estate 
market of Amsterdam from 1509 until 1811 to assess the existence of foreclosure discounts 
and spillover effects of real estate foreclosure discounts on neighboring properties.  
This topic gained attention after the housing crisis 2008 in the United States and was the topic 
of much recent literature. Campbell et al. (2011) find an average foreclosure discount of 27% 
relative to the value of the house, using a hedonic regression in a dataset of 1.8 million 
transactions in Massachusetts and significant spillover effects. They find a spillover effect that 
suggests, that each foreclosure that takes place 0.05  miles away lowers the price of a house  
by about 1%. This means that 2 houses which show the same hedonic characteristics (excluding 
the sales method) sell for different prices when one is sold as a foreclosure and one is sold 
normally. As foreclosure discounts are an indicator of a market inefficiency or at least process 
inefficiency it should be of academic interest, even more so when such a market inefficiency 
causes spillover effects that magnify the market inefficiency. 
Next to academic interest, foreclosure discount have implications for optimal LTVs (Loan-to-
value ratios) and spillover effects of foreclosures imply a significant challenge for regulators 
and economists, as significant spillover effects reinforce residential real estate crises. This is a 
consequence of the strong link between residential real estate markets with credit cycles and 
thus the indirect link with business cycles (Jordà et al. 2014). In this context spillover effects 
will in a scenario like in 2008, where the number of foreclosures in the United States increased 
by 79% from 650,000 in the first half of 2007 to 1.2 million foreclosures in the first half of 
2008 (Mayer et al. 2009), substantially impact the overall economic well-being via decreasing 
real estate values. Decreased real estate values, on the one hand reduce, the overall wealth level 
but on the other hand decreases recovery rates on defaulting real estate credits, which will 
materialize in worsening financial wellbeing of lenders. The worsening financial wellbeing of 
lenders will limit the supply of credit for new properties and consequently, reduce demand and 
hence reduce market liquidity.   
The collapse in the United States [U.S.] housing market following the financial crisis in 2008 
led to a 35% drop in house prices and an increase in mortgages with defaulting payments that 
reached over 10% in 2009. Mortgage contracts allow lenders to foreclose on a home when the 
homeowner defaults on his payment obligations (Mian et al. 2015). Consequently when major 
shocks hit the economy and lead to millions of simultaneous defaults, various models 
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emphasize the amplification of shocks caused by the forced sale of leveraged real estate 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1992, Kiyotaki and Moore 1997, Krishnamurthy 2003, 2009, and 
Lorenzoni 2008), as a systematic emergency sale of foreclosed real estate could lead to a further 
reduction in house prices, affecting real activity such as housing investment and consumer 
demand. Mian et al. (2015) find a strong correlation between state foreclosure laws and 
foreclosure propensity, which indicates that the judicial environment might be an instrument 
to reduce the negative externalities of forced sales. In this context, this thesis will provide new 
insights into how a unique foreclosure process impacted forced sales discounts. 
Other theoretical models predicting a supply‐induced price effect of foreclosures are often 
based on temporary market displacement where buyers of assets face limits in their ability to 
purchase the corresponding assets (Shleifer and Vishny 1992; Krishnamurthy 2003; Lorenzoni 
2008). This represents a situation where real estate prices are driven down, hence reducing 
potential collateral value due to increased supply with decreased demand, this price dynamic 
will consequently reduce demand even more by driving down property values which did not 
foreclose by the usual economic effect of demand and supply, as reduced home prices reduce 
collateral values, wealth and consequently the ability of people to purchase additional property. 
This thesis will study the existence of foreclosure discounts as driving factor of this market 
dynamic in a unique sample of the Amsterdam residential real estate market from the 16th to 
19th century with an uncommonly high degree of detail and a unique foreclosure process. In 
addition to that this thesis will investigate the time variation of this foreclosure discounts and 
will try to combine quantitative and qualitative methods to draw conclusions on the drivers of 
foreclosure discounts during the sample period. In a third step this thesis analyzes the 
occurrence of spillover effects, this analysis will deal with the unique sample features and 
confirm previous research.  
While there are several streams of literature that discuss foreclosure discounts and spillover 
effects to the best of my knowledge there is no discussion of such effects in a historical setting,  
with foreclosure processes and macroeconomic conditions different from today. This thesis 
exploits a unique dataset of the city of Amsterdam to research the impact of foreclosures on 
residential real estate. The dataset is taken from Amsterdam City Archives and consists of 
164,047 real estate transactions in Amsterdam and its surroundings from 1509 until 1811. Due 
to the historical setting, the data has an uncommonly high level of detail on the transaction 
level, which results in 84 variables across 164,047 transactions. This allows verifying 
quantitative hypothesis via a qualitative and quantitative analysis of micro-level data. This 
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thesis uses the microdata at multiple occasions to verify a hypothesis while restricting the 
analysis to a reasonable grade of detail due to the time constraints of a master thesis, this 
provides unique insights and might serve as a source for future research. In addition to that, 
Amsterdam applied a unique foreclosure process during the covered time period, which allows 
to compare the procedural efficiency when dealing with foreclosures today and during the 
sample period. We can see that the Anglo-Dutch premium auction significantly reduced 
negative externalities by having a 2-step procedure which defines upper and lower boundaries 
for the final bidding round (Boerner et al. 2012). This is unlike auction processes today, which 
generally only set lower boundaries and hence expose the bidder to larger uncertainties, such 
as characteristics like the exposure to potential additional claims on the property or the limited 
inspection right are similar in both procedures (Shneyerov et al. 2015). This enables us to 
investigate the process efficiency of an alternative procedure for foreclosures under different 
macroeconomic conditions and over the full real estate cycle. This thesis finds that the overall 
process efficiency was very high, which is in line with previous research (Harding et al. 2012) 
that states that in efficient markets foreclosure discounts seem counterintuitive but it also 
highlights the efficiency of the Anglo-Dutch premium auction process which confirms the 
research of Boerner et al. (2012). 
Due to the long period which is covered time variation in foreclosure discounts can be 
identified. The high detail grade of the data and the long time period help to identify the drivers 
of time-varying foreclosure discounts. This thesis identifies time variance by a simply 
identifying foreclosure discounts in different time brackets, then it looks at the unique features 
of every time period. Given that institutions are constant throughout the full sample period, the 
features of the different time periods were used to develop a hypothesis about the drivers of 
foreclosure discounts, which is tested in a later step. The analysis of foreclosure discounts 
during and after times of crises is complemented by a qualitative analysis of individual investor 
behavior to strengthen the quantitative hypothesis. Overall this thesis contributes to existing 
literature by analyzing a detailed dataset in an integrated approach combining quantitative 
results with qualitative analysis. The results of this thesis do not only enhance our 
understanding of foreclosure effects and possible externalities of foreclosures on neighboring 
properties but provide new insights by covering multiple real estate cycles in a historic setting 
with unique procedures, while allowing for detailed conclusions due to the high data quality.  
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This study finds no significant foreclosure discounts over the full sample period, which 
indicates high efficiency when dealing with foreclosures in the unique setting of the sample 
period. This is in line with the argumentation of Harding et al. (2012) who argue that the 
existence of a foreclosure discount would represent an arbitrage opportunity. When analyzing 
time variation of foreclosure discounts I find significant foreclosure discounts in certain time 
periods, which is opposing the findings of Harding et al. (2012) but confirming the findings of 
Aroul and Hansz (2014), who find time-varying foreclosure discounts. While an analysis of 
drivers shows that foreclosure discounts decrease with increasing market price levels, no 
statistical significance can be found, the same applies to the number of foreclosures in the 
market. While the central drivers remain quantitively unclear, the results of this thesis confirm 
the findings of Harding et al. (2012) of no excess returns when acquiring property in a 
foreclosure sale and selling via normal procedures. The analysis reveals significant foreclosure 
discounts when a property was bought via normal procedures and sold via foreclosure sales in 
certain subperiods. This unique finding combined with an analysis of individual investor 
behavior leads to the hypothesis that foreclosure discounts might be driven by the quality of 
the real estate, which might not be driven by the fundamental quality but rather be a 
consequence of delayed maintenance as a consequence of the financial problems of 
homeowners preceding a foreclosure. This argumentation is in line with Clauretie and 
Daneshvary (2009) and Sumell (2009), who find that foreclosure discounts are higher in houses 
exhibiting less quality.  
When analyzing spillover effects I find significant negative spillover effect of 0.3% from 
foreclosures to other properties in the same street. As the data allows to identify the location 
of properties on a street level, while having very long streets with over 600 properties in the 
sample, it is tested whether the street length influences the degree of the spillover effect. When 
analyzing the spillover effect in the 40 largest streets and in the rest of all streets, as a basic test 
which reflects the high skewness of properties per streets, I find a larger spillover effect [0.6%] 
in the smaller streets while spillover effects show a smaller economic magnitude [0.2%] and 
no statistical significance for the 40 largest streets. This is in line with previous findings of 
previous research which finds that spillover effects are a highly local phenomenon (Lin et al. 
2009; Towe and Lawley 2013; Immergluck and Smith 2006; Harding et al. 2009; Munroe and 
Wilse-Samson 2013; Campbell et al. 2011). When quantifying this effect it can be seen that 
the spillover effects reduce per additional building in the street by 0.006%, hence the more 
buildings in the street, the smaller the spillover effects. As Li (2017) argued that spillover 
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effects are time variant, the same basic analysis of splitting the sample period into different 
sub-periods was applied in this thesis to identify potential time variation. The results of  Li 
(2017) are confirmed insofar, that I find significant time variance in spillover effects. 
Furthermore, the spillover effects seem to be related to the general price development in the 
real estate market, as significant positive spillover effects co-occur with times of crisis in the 
residential property market. 
A microdata level analysis reveals that many large investors in the real estate market refrained 
from purchasing properties in times of crisis and hence pulled out of the market, rather than 
buying foreclosed properties in large-scale. The same applies to people who are affected by 
large scale foreclosures, most people with large-scale foreclosures did not return to the real 
estate market despite being part of families with substantial wealth. Both groups are people 
which should be able to provide liquidity in a market which is distressed, as this is not 
happening a possible explanation for increasing foreclosure discounts and increasing spillover 
effects in times of crisis might be the structural change of the relationship between supply and 
demand. As the full sample period is characterized by a demand overhang due to the continuous 
population increase, the sudden removal of demand and creation of excess supply might have 
driven up foreclosure discounts and spillover effects, as an exact quantitative assessment is 
beyond the scope of that thesis this theory relies on descriptive statistics and is subject to further 
research.  
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 will discuss the streams of literature 
which are affected by this thesis and develop the working hypothesis for this thesis. After that, 
chapter 3 will give an overview of the historical context and give an introduction to the 
procedural circumstances in the specific historic context. This is followed by chapter 4 which 
introduces the data used in this thesis and its unique characteristics. Chapter 5 will analyze 
foreclosure discounts over the full sample period via quantitative and qualitative methods, the 
finding will be extended in chapter 6 where the time variance of foreclosure discounts is 
investigated. To finish the analysis chapter 7 will investigate the presence and characteristics 
of spillover effects of foreclosures during the sample period. The chapters 5 to 7 all start with 
an explanation of the applied methodology and continue with the research results. In chapter 8 
the results of the analysis part are contextualized and further discussed. The thesis will end 
with identifying the limitations of this thesis and the needs for further research before 
concluding this thesis.  
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2. Literature review 
Several streams of literature are affected by this thesis. While it is related to the current 
discussion of foreclosure discounts, this thesis also adds new academic findings to the 
assessment of spillover effects of discounts of foreclosed properties on neighboring properties. 
Lastly, this research adds to the understanding of real estate markets in a historical context. 
2.1. Foreclosure discounts 
This thesis is related to theoretical literature investigating the impact of foreclosures on real 
estate prices. The stream of literature investigating foreclosure discounts in real estate markets 
is widely accepted and is based on multiple quantitative studies of housing data. Pennington-
Cross (2004) finds a foreclosure discount of 22% using a repeat sales methodology on US-
housing data from 1995-1999. For Cleveland, Sumell (2009) finds a foreclosure discount of up 
to 50% for single-family houses. Campbell et al. (2011) find an average foreclosure discount 
of 27% relative to the value of the house, using a hedonic regression in a dataset of 1.8 million 
transactions in Massachusetts. They explain this discount as a cost of protection against 
vandalism risks, as houses are unprotected as they are likely to not inhabited. Zhou et al. (2015) 
find that foreclosure discounts are negatively related to recent house-price appreciation and 
find that high foreclosure discounts for lower value properties are likely due to property 
conditions. Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009) report in a comprehensive analysis a conditional 
foreclosure discount of less than 10% in data for Clark County, Nevada, between 2004 and 
2007. They use a hedonic regression controlling for various property and neighborhood 
characteristics such as time on the market, cash sales and property condition.  
Hardin and Wolverton (1996) extended the research focusing not exclusively on residential 
real estate but including income creating investment properties, they confirm the existence of 
foreclosure discounts in a magnitude of 22%. They argue that investors might be willing to 
accept discounts due to atypical seller motivations such as satisfying regulatory capital 
requirements, mitigating negative stock price effects or protecting credit ratings.  
While most literature researches housing prices in the United States Donner et al. (2016) use 
data on sold apartments and single family homes from 2006 to 2013 in Stockholm, Sweden, to 
check via a hedonic spatial Durbin model for foreclosure discounts. They find a foreclosure 
discount of 20.1% for foreclosed apartments and 24.6% for foreclosed single-family houses 
and find in addition to that, that foreclosure discounts increase when the number of transactions 
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is limited. The second European sample, which is based on a universe of adult Danes in the 
period between 1990 and 2010 used by Andersen and Nielsen (2017). They conduct a natural 
experiment that reveals, that foreclosure discounts are larger in when house prices contract. 
The authors argue that the magnitude of discounts is related to the urgency of a sale, defined 
by the current market conditions and the financial situation of the seller.  
In general, there seems to be a consensus about the existence of the default discount in recent 
literature but the reason behind this discount is continuously debated, one line of reasoning is 
that foreclosed properties, on average, are of lower quality as distressed owners of homes are 
less likely to maintain the property. This is confirmed by Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009) and 
Sumell (2009), who find that foreclosed homes with lower quality rating exhibit larger-than-
average foreclosure discounts. Opposed to that, Harding et al. (2012) argue that the existence 
of a foreclosure discount would represent arbitrage opportunities and would hence allow 
purchasers of REOs [Real estate owned] to generate positive excess returns. They test this 
hypothesis by comparing the holding returns of REO buyers with those of buyers of similar 
properties that are not in financial distress and do not find significant excess returns for 
investors in distressed properties. Hence, they argue that the market for REOs operates 
efficiently and hence no arbitrage opportunity can exist which would, in fact, be an argument 
against the systematic existence of a foreclosure discount. This view is supported by Carroll et 
al. (1997), who comment in their paper the results of Forgey et al. (1994) and argue that the 
inclusion of ZIP-code dummies and common characteristics between foreclosed properties and 
their neighboring properties, causes the findings of significant foreclosure discounts between 
12.18% and 13.96% to diminish to insignificant values between 0.17% and 2.59%. 
Consequently, Carroll et al. (1997) argue finding a significant foreclosure discount is the 
consequence of omitted variables in the statistical assessment rather than the existence of an 
economically significant discount. 
This view is opposed by Aroul and Hansz (2014) who hypothesize that foreclosure discounts 
are dependent on house price volatility. Therefore the authors analyze foreclosure discounts in 
a sample of Fresno, California from 2006 to 2010, which due to the housing crisis in 2008 
incorporates significant house price volatility. They find a 20% discount for foreclosure 
transactions which remains consistent when controlling for the endogeneity of time-on-the-
market and self-selection bias. The magnitude of foreclosure discounts was challenged by  
Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009), who argue that, under the assumption of efficiency in real 
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estate markets, foreclosure discounts of 20% seem counterintuitive. The authors argue that 
findings that confirm foreclosure discounts of that magnitude are caused by an upward bias 
induced by omitted variables, they name the physical condition of the property and the 
relationship between marketing time and price as examples for such omitted variables. 
Zhou et al. (2015) argue that the high variability in identified foreclosure discounts arises due 
to a lack of common definition of a foreclosure discount and subsequently define a foreclosure 
discount as the discount of the real estate owned (REO) sale price relative to a normal-sale 
estimated market value. They apply this definition on a dataset of 1.34 million REO sale 
transactions across 16 core-based statistical area (CBSAs) between 2000 and 2012 and find a 
significant foreclosure discount. Next, to that, they state three other empirical noteworthy 
findings, they find that a concentration of foreclosure sales increases the foreclosure discount, 
that foreclosure discounts are negatively related to recent house price appreciations and that 
high foreclosure discounts are often associated by houses of lower quality.  
Summarizing it can be said that there seems to be a consensus about the fact that foreclosing 
properties sell at lower prices than properties which are not sold via foreclosures while there is 
an ongoing debate about whether this represents an arbitrage opportunity and is hence a market 
inefficiency or whether the lower sales price is inherent in the different conditions of foreclosed 
properties. This thesis tries to incorporate structural quality difference effects in the 
methodology and hence focuses on the explanation of foreclosure discount via a market 
inefficiency which might be explained by procedural uncertainty (Chinloy et al. 2017). In this 
context I use the similarity of foreclosure processes, namely having no right to inspect the 
property that is auctioned, having a remaining risk of additional claims on the property which 
are not addressed by the process of the execution remission and the fact that borrowers which 
foreclose are likely to have experienced a significant period of financial distress before 
foreclosing and hence might have neglected required maintenance on the property. To 
hypothesize that I will find a significant foreclosure discount throughout the full sample period, 
despite the earlier described procedural advantages of the Dutch-Anglo premium auction 
(Boerner et al. 2012). I believe that the quality effect, which might be driven by the financial 
situation of the owner, by for example delaying required maintenance, in combination with the 
lack of an inspection right and the remaining risk of additional claims on the auctioned property 
are dominating the effect of the advantageous procedural design of Anglo-Dutch premium 
auctions. This assumption is partly driven by the uncertainty of the range given by the 
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auctioneer, as the upper range is non-binding it might not significantly reduce the uncertainty 
when it is chosen very high. In addition to this main hypothesis I hypothesize to see time 
variation in foreclosure discounts, as the full sample covers multiple real estate cycles and Zhou 
et al. (2015) find a negative relation of foreclosure discounts to price appreciation in real estate 
markets I expect to see increasing foreclosure discounts in the times of economic crisis which 
materialized in a residential real estate crisis, for example, the period after the beginning of the 
Anglo-Dutch war in 1784 and the connected negative impacts on the economy. I do expect this 
time variation to be significant, as Amsterdam experienced during the sample period a large 
increase of inhabitants, as described by van der Woude (1982), this means that there has been 
very high demand for properties during the times of economic prosperity which is covered in 
the sample. As housing supply is limited and can only be extended gradually over time, I 
assume that the demand-overhang caused in many cases that the access to housing, irrespective 
of the procedural form of purchasing the property, was outweighing the previously described 
uncertainty associated with foreclosure sales. While this might have been valid in times of 
economic prosperity and inhabitants growth, this can not be assumed in times of economic 
crisis, as this limits the amount of potential real estate buyers and hence reduces or even reverts 
the demand overhang. In these times procedural uncertainties connected to the foreclosure 
process increase, as worsening economic conditions, also increase the risk of additional claims 
on the property as people might try to overcome seemingly temporary financial difficulties 
arising for example after a loss of a job, with additional credits where the own real estate is 
used as collateral. As in times of crisis, the effect of a demand overhang reduces and the risks 
associated with foreclosure sales increase, I hypothesize to find intra-sample time variance of 
foreclosure discounts which might be associated with the overall price development of the real 
estate market, as this seems to be a reasonable indicator for the prevalent supply-and-demand 
relationship. 
2.2. Spillover effects of foreclosure discounts 
The assumption that in many cases a contagion effect of foreclosure discounts on nearby 
properties exists is researched in the second stream of literature which relates to this thesis. 
Here analyzing co-movements of Case‐Shiller Home Price Indices for 14 metropolitan areas 
in the United States between 1992 and 2008 Kallberg et al. (2014) find that the co-movements, 
which are not attributable to the fundamental factors that determine real estate prices, are 
increasing over time. They argue that this increase can be explained mainly by the underlying 
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systematic real and financial factors and that this would be consistent with a greater 
fundamental integration of these markets. But the authors also argue that the existing excess 
co-movements are a less important factor for structural housing prices than commonly 
believed. Immergluck and Smith (2006) find in a dataset of more than 9,600 property 
transactions in Chicago in 1999 that foreclosures within an eighth of a mile of a single‐family 
home result in a decline of 0.9% in value of the home which has not been foreclosed. In the 
same line of research Harding et al. (2009) find that evidence of a contagion discount of roughly 
1% per nearby foreclosed property by simultaneously estimating the local price trend and the 
incremental price impact of nearby foreclosures. They also find a high local dependency, via 
strong decreases in contagions discounts, when the distance to the foreclosed property is 
increased.  
Lin et al. (2009) find that spillover effects of a foreclosure on neighborhood property values 
depend on two factors: the discount of foreclosure sale and similarity of the property that was 
foreclosed to the property that is sold, as these factors drive the inclusion of a transaction in 
the valuation multiple. Their empirical analysis identified a radius of 0.9 kilometers [km] in 
which foreclosed properties cause contagion discounts while these discounts show a declining 
persistence over 5 years. In their sample, the most severe contagion discount is 8.7% discount, 
which gradually drops to anywhere between 1.7% to 4.7% over the time period of up to 5 years 
after the liquidation sale.  
Arguing that most previous research on spillover effects of foreclosure discounts on non-
distressed house sales are based on samples from stable housing market periods, Daneshvary 
et al. (2011) use transactions for 2008 from a housing market with a relatively large number of 
REO sales and foreclosures. They find that REOs and foreclosures have the same spillover 
effects and quantify this effect at 1%. Consequently, they analyzed that the total cumulative 
effect of distressed neighbors can cause a loss of value on a neighboring property of up to 8%. 
When distressed sales are excluded from this estimation the marginal spillover effect increases 
to 2% and the maximum cumulative effect in the sample increases to about 21%.  
This is in line with the research of Li (2017), who finds a negative effect on property prices is 
significant from nearby foreclosures, real estate owned (REO) listings and REO sales, but not 
from default and delinquent properties. She also states that there is time-variation in terms of 
having a larger effect in depressed markets and a smaller effect in appreciating markets. The 
author argues that the most plausible explanation for the spillover effect is a depression of the 
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associated reference prices. By disentangling the effect of changed supply and dis-amenity 
stemming from deferred maintenance or vacancy of neighboring properties Hartley (2014) 
wants to isolate the cause for spillover effects in the neighborhood. The author finds that the 
effect of dis-amenity is close to zero while each extra unit of supply decreases prices within 
0.05 miles by about 1.2%, which is in line with the magnitude of previously measured spillover 
effects. Extending the research to measuring not only the impact of a neighboring foreclosure 
and REO process but including the duration of such an impact Zhang et al. (2015) find a 
negative neighborhood effect, measured by the negative externalities resulting of neighboring 
foreclosure and REO processes when extending the length of the foreclosure process. 
Towe and Lawley (2013) extend their research beyond quantifying the effect of foreclosures 
on neighboring property values and hypothesize that foreclosures have an impact on the 
foreclosure likelihood of neighboring property and this implies a negative social multiplier 
effect of foreclosures on neighborhoods. They do find that a neighbor foreclosure increased the 
likelihood of additional defaults within the neighborhood by 18%. This is in line with the 
findings of Munroe and Wilse-Samson (2013), who find that completed foreclosures cause 
between 0.5 and 0.7 additional filings within 0.1 miles and argue that learning plays an 
important role in contagion, rather than the pecuniary externality of the neighboring 
foreclosure, as the contagion effect is largely driven by borrowers which are not facing the 
immediate threat of default.  
Analyzing the implications and dynamics in “hard-hit” neighborhoods in New York City and 
the core counties of Atlanta and Miami, Ellen et al. (2014) find that the most affected regions 
measured by the relative occurrence of REOs do not show characteristics of being the poorest 
or having the highest unemployment rates. They also do not find that investors do account for 
a significantly higher proportion of purchasers of REO properties in the hardest-hit 
neighborhoods than in other neighborhoods. 
While there seems to be a general consensus on the fact that foreclosures do have an impact on 
their neighborhood, Calomiris et al. (2012) argue that the association, which can be observed 
between non-distressed house prices and foreclosures, is mostly driven by the endogenous 
adjustment of foreclosures to prices via the strategic choices of homeowners and lenders and 
not through the effects of foreclosures on home prices. The authors base this argument on a 
panel VAR, including macroeconomic and housing variables such as employment, permits or 
sales, using quarterly state‐level data from 1981 until 2009. They find a dominating 
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relationship where prices have a much larger impact on foreclosures than vice versa. 
Summarizing the literature of spillover effects from foreclosures, recent literature finds that the 
spillover phenomenon is a highly local effect which decreases with increasing distance to the 
property, when it comes to explaining the spillover effect the main theories are that prices 
which are used for comparison are influenced by a property which foreclosed and possibly was 
sold at a discount or that a lack of maintenance on foreclosed properties damaged the 
neighboring properties by diminishing the appearance of the neighborhood (Harding et al. 
2009) or that changes in supply cause the spillover effect (Hartley 2014). Another explanation 
is the inclusion of foreclosed properties when assessing the value of a nearby property, under 
the assumption that the foreclosed property transaction was processed at a discount (Lin et al. 
2009). As little is known about value assessments of property in the 16th to 19th century in 
Amsterdam, but the conditions of deteriorating neighborhood appearances as a consequence of 
lack of incentivization and lack of financial resources to maintain the property and the effect 
of supply changes should be present in a historical setting, significant spillover effects are 
expected throughout the full sample period. This can be supported when foreclosure sales are 
seen as sales which involuntarily add supply to a market in an unideal moment market. Hence 
these transactions create market imbalances via creating excess supply, relative to the normal 
supply level which characterizes a respective period. That materializes in changed supply-and-
demand relationships that consequently change the price for properties that are similar in terms 
of fundamental characteristics and location. Consequently, I expect strong time variance of 
these effects with an increase in spillover effects, when demand is limited by for example 
worsening economic conditions and changes in supply directly materialize changes in price 
and are not masked by excess demand, this hypothesis is in line with the argumentation of Li 
(2017). 
3. Historical Background 
This section will provide the general historical background of Amsterdam for the studied 
period and discuss the general structure of the housing market in Amsterdam and the procedural 
requirements for the acquisition of houses during the sample period. This description is 
complemented by an introduction into the legal proceedings following a default of creditors in 
the context of real estate credits. In addition to that, I will introduce the Anglo-Dutch premium 
auction as the auction mechanism of foreclosure sales and compare this mechanism with the 
currently prevalent form of foreclosure auctions. 
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3.1. Amsterdam in the 17th and 18th century 
The studied period from 1509 until 1811 covers the rise of the Netherlands to European 
economic leadership, the Dutch Golden Age and the subsequent decline of the Dutch economy. 
During that time Amsterdam played a central role for the Dutch economy and became a global 
trade capital, but the time period also covers Amsterdam’s decline of importance as trade 
capital, due to the emergence of competitors like London and the German North Sea ports. The 
book of de Vries and van der Woude (2007) describes the development of the Dutch economy 
from 1500 until 1815 and serves as the main source of information for the remainder of this  
section.  
Amsterdam had an important role as a driver of the Dutch economy due to its role as European 
trade hub which hosted at its heights more than half of Europe’s total merchant marine capacity 
(Blanning 2008). In the late 16th and 17th century Amsterdam accumulated rapidly trade capital 
from merchants outside of the Dutch Republic. High-risk ventures like revolutionary 
expeditions to the lands of South and Southeast Asia attracted those merchants and were soon 
incorporated into the Dutch East India Company (VOC). The success of the VOC can be seen 
in the enormous profits and the expansion of the fleet from 827 ships before 1610 to 3049 ships 
between 1650 and 1660 (Parthesius 2010), which not only illustrates the economic success of 
those ventures but also the importance of Amsterdam for the global trade activities. This 
economic success led to fast pace population growth and strong urbanization, defined as 
population increase in cities is higher than the population increase in rural areas. This 
materialized in an increase from 150 thousand inhabitants in urban areas in the region of 
Holland in 1550 to approximately 400 thousand inhabitants in urban areas in the same region 
in 1650 (van der Woude 1982). Given the aerial limitations in Amsterdam, several expansion 
projects were required (Abrahamse 2010) to satisfy the increased need for housing in 
Amsterdam. In the 1650s the boom period reached its zenith with an overall productivity, 
which was the highest in Europe at the time and has been reflected in the high wage level of 
the Netherlands during that period.  
However, two mutually reinforcing economic trends ended the boom period in the Dutch 
Republic. The closure of major European markets as a consequence of the second Anglo-Dutch 
war, Dutch-Swedish War and the Franco-Dutch War and the associated protectionist measures 
which the European countries took, led to an end of the increases in trade volumes for the 
Dutch economy. In isolation, the effect of reduced trade volume growth would probably not 
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have been so severe, but at the same time the continuous trend of rising price levels had 
reversed from inflation to deflation. Due to the stickiness of nominal wages in economic 
downturns (Bernanke and Carey 1996) real wages continued to rise, despite the economic 
downturn. Both reinforcing trends led to a substantial economic downturn and stopped the 
fourth expansion of the city of Amsterdam (Abrahamse 2010).  
Despite this severe economic downturn, the economy of Amsterdam managed to recover 
during the late 17th and early 18th century. Amsterdam remained a wealthy city and repositioned 
itself as a leading financial center, in close cooperation with London. During the 18th century 
the population of Amsterdam remained at a constant level and consequently, there have been 
little changes in the housing stock. The period of political neutrality which characterized the 
18th century of the Netherlands came to an end in 1780 with the start of the fourth Anglo-Dutch 
war. This marked also the end of wealth for Amsterdam, which was taken over entirely by the 
French in 1795 (de Vries and van der Woude 2007). 
3.2. The housing market and procedural requirements for property transactions in 
Amsterdam 
The economic importance of Amsterdam during the sample period and the consequential rise 
of the population in Amsterdam indicate the important role of the housing market in 
Amsterdam. Korevaar (2018) used the same archival data that is used in this thesis to discuss 
the structure of the housing market in Amsterdam and analyzes four features of the housing 
market. The description of the housing market and the introduction to procedural requirements 
for acquiring real estate during the 16th and 17th are mainly based on his work, the work of (van 
Bochove et al. 2015) and is complemented by additional research in this area. 
Every transaction of real estate had to ratified and registered in front of the aldermen of 
Amsterdam (schepenen). Auctions or alternative forms of transfer organizations were possible 
but did not exempt buyer and seller from the duty to register the transfer with the alderman to 
initiate the formal transfer of ownership. The registration of property transfers was a 
requirement all over the Dutch Republic and was administered at the municipality level. The 
oldest available register for Amsterdam stems from 1563 and the latest transaction was 
registered in 1811. 
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Regular property sales were recorded in an act of ordinary remission (ordinaris kwijtschelding) 
that followed a standard format, as shown in the transcribed example in appendix A, that is 
taken from Korevaar (2018), which describes a transaction of the famous painter Rembrandt 
The text shows, that the sellers’ name and the buyers’ name are mentioned and that the buyer 
had to bring two guarantors for the transfer. In addition, it becomes apparent that buyer or seller 
that could not legally represent themselves, such as died homeowners, women and children, 
had to be represented by guardians, which were usually close family members. Furthermore, 
details about the purchased object are described in a way which should ensure the correct 
identification of the transferred object. This description included the property itself but also the 
location. This is important as homes were not numbered in during the sample period and the 
location was identified based on the street name, points of interest or the owners of houses 
nearby. Additionally, the data set reveals that house prices are only recorded from 1637 
onwards and while it was common to have multiple sellers, it was less common to have multiple 
buyers, which could be explained by the fact that many transactions with multiple sellers name 
the heirs of the original owner.Next to regular sales (ordinary remission) there were additional 
forms of property transfers. When a homeowner defaulted on a loan, which were always full 
recourse loans in the Dutch Republic during the time of the sample period, the possessed 
property could be auctioned off by the creditors via the city of Amsterdam, the exact process 
is described in the following chapter.  
As Amsterdam had a large market for private credit it was possible that creditors had claims 
on a property although the debtor sold the property off. This was generally limited to a time 
period of 1 year. In case an acquirer of a house wanted to ensure that no creditor had a 
remaining right on the property which was acquired, the seller and buyer had to possibility to 
transact the property via a willig decreet at the court of Holland (van Iterson 1939). During that 
process, the acquisition was made public three times in 14-day intervals, which allowed 
creditors to make a claim and settle the debt. After that procedure, the creditor had no rights 
anymore on the property and had to settle the credit with the debtor without the initial security. 
Korevaar (2018) notes that this process was often used when there was significant doubt about 
the fact whether all credits have been repaid by the seller, as he finds a close correlation 
between the number of willig decreeten and the number of foreclosure sales. A similar process 
existed for foreclosure sales, these transactions were named onwillig decreeten and followed 
the same process with the same underlying reasons, with having a foreclosed property being 
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transacted.Another possibility was the transfer of property via the orphan chamber 
(weeskamer), the orphan chamber had the legal authority to register all transactions with a 
relation to the property of orphans in the books of orphan guard auctions 
(weesmeesterverkopingen), hence these transactions were not registered with the aldermen. 
3.3. Defaults and other market dynamics in the housing market of Amsterdam 
When a homeowner defaulted on the payments agreed upon in the mortgage agreement in 
Amsterdam in the 16th and 17th century there were three legal ways in which the property was 
transferred which are similar to modern foreclosure sales. The most used form was the transfer 
via an execution remission (executie kwijschelding), in this process the bailiff of Amsterdam 
would seize the assets of the debtor for the creditor, here it was common that the debtor had a 
possibility to pay the debt and subsequently avoid the seizure of his assets. When the asset was 
seized by the bailiff the debtor could request a letter from the aldermen, granting the permission 
for the auctioning of the seized asset. This was usually done via public auctions organized by 
the city of Amsterdam. After the auction, the transfer of ownership was directly registered with 
the aldermen as an execution remission (executie kwijschelding). This form of defaults shows 
significant similarities to the organization of foreclosure sales today. Boerner et al. (2012) 
describe an the Anglo-Dutch auction process which represents the auction process used during 
the 18th and 18th century in Amsterdam. An Anglo-Dutch premium auction constituted of two 
possible rounds of bidding. In the first round, bidders bid against each other with ascending 
prices as in a standard English auction, the highest bidder of the first round would receive a 
pre-determined cash prize (premium), regardless of the outcome of the second round. In the 
second round, the auctioneer would set a high price and call out decreasing prices if somebody 
was willing to bid a price between the high price and the highest price of the first round that 
person would win the auctioned object, hence everybody could participate in the second round. 
If no bid was made in the second round the winner of the first round would win the object. The 
earliest auctions following that process are documented in 1529 and were used throughout the 
Dutch Republic in the 18th and 19th century to sell real estate and other goods. Today there 
are two main forms of foreclosures: judicial foreclosure, which requires the creditor to go to 
court and receive a judge’s approval to foreclose a property and nonjudicial foreclosure, where 
the creditor may sell the property or repossesses it without a judge’s approval (Enoch et al. 
2014). When looking at the process of judicial foreclosures today, as described for the state of 
Florida by Shneyerov et al. (2015), one can see that when the borrower defaults the court grants 
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the lender, upon specific request of the lender, a right to foreclose a property. After that, the 
lender is allowed to auction the property off to the highest bidder, in general via English 
auctions. While the title is transferred to the highest bidder, certain liens and encumbrances 
may survive the foreclosure sale. It is the obligation of the bidder to find out about these liens 
and encumbrances, which creates a high level of uncertainty. This uncertainty is increased by 
the fact that no “open houses” will be held, hence the bidder does not have the right to inspect 
the property before engaging in the auction. Similarly to the Anglo-Dutch process, it is 
common that the lender makes a bid for the property, which can be seen as reserve price and 
sets a lower price boundary previous to the auction process.  
When comparing both processes we can identify interesting similarities and differences, which 
might have implications on the efficiency of the full process. In both processes, the acquirer of 
the foreclosed property is exposed to the risk of a remaining claim on the property, which could 
only be remedied during the sample period via onwillig decreeten or willig decreeten at the 
court of Holland as described before. When looking at the auction process it becomes apparent 
that the uncertainty remains high in both procedures due to the limited inspection rights, but 
the design of the Anglo-Dutch auction seems to be beneficial in terms of uncertainty as it 
determines lower and upper boundaries before entering in the final bidding stage, while 
auctions today just set lower boundaries by the bid of the lender. This is confirmed by the 
empirical findings of Boerner et al. (2012), who find a positive empirical connection between 
greater uncertainty in the security’s value and a greater likelihood of a second-stage bid, which 
exhibits the characteristics of having upper and lower value boundaries. The authors state that 
this particular auction design solved a complex market problem and led to efficient auction 
prices. In the context of foreclosure discounts, the unique process design during the sample 
period might have reduced procedural uncertainty and hence reduced one explanatory factor 
for structural foreclosure discounts.  
Mian et al. (2015) describe that institutions and regulations of foreclosure processes have 
implications on the likelihood of foreclosing a property and hence have implications for the 
change of housing supply in the market. This might lead to changing market dynamics with 
changes in regulation and hence would have to be reflected in the econometric method. This 
concern is remedied by the fact that the institutions and processes remain constant within the 
full sample, despite having a time-variant share on total transactions. 
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4. Data  
The initial dataset “transportakten” from the Amsterdam City Archives consisted of 164,047 
real estate transactions in Amsterdam and its surroundings from 1509 until 1811. The dataset 
constituted of the transaction ID to identify the transaction, sub-transaction ID to distinguish 
between potential multiple buyers and sellers, property ID to identify the property which was 
transacted. Additionally, the data includes a series, which identified the legal transfer 
procedure, for example, obedient court orders or execution remission. The transactions are 
further described by the date of the transfer, the purchase price of the transaction, the full name 
of all involved buyers and sellers or their potential legal representatives, in case of legal 
representation the data provides the reason for the requirement of legal representation. The 
location of the transacted property is defined by the place of the location for example 
“Amsterdam”, the street name of the real estate, the original street name, the name of the house, 
if applicable and the position of the property for example “over het Boshuis” (over the forest 
house). Additional variables identified the nature of the transacted good, the data distinguishes 
between for example between house, land, rear house, garden, warehouse, workshop and 18 
more subcategories which help to understand the nature of the transacted property. In total the 
dataset has 84 variables across 164,047 transactions with 454,680 entries. 
The dataset was transformed for the necessary analysis in this thesis. In order to clean the 
dataset, the following restrictions were given for each subsample. Every transaction was 
included once, when a transaction was recorded multiple time e.g. when multiple sellers sold 
one house only the first seller was included in the dataset. As a next step all transactions that 
did not take place in Amsterdam were excluded, here a very strict approach was applied, 
excluding every transaction that did not have “Amsterdam” as an entry for the variable “Plaats” 
(place), in order to avoid noise from different pricing dynamics outside of Amsterdam. As a 
fourth step, every transaction that did not include a house was excluded, this was done via 
using the dummy variable “huis” (house) as a filter, this limits the sample to residential real 
estate. As a next step houses that were transacted for a price of zero or where no price was 
given were excluded, as prices of zero should not represent a market-driven price building for 
a house with an intrinsic value that should be higher than zero in any case. Usually, prices of 
zero are given in the sample when the price cannot be seen in the record of the transaction. To 
control for double entries a control variable was created by combining the date of the 
transaction, the property ID and the “bedraag” (price). This variable was filtered for double 
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entries. As all previously described data adjustments were done using automated tools in excel, 
the resulting datasets were checked manually for double entries and merged into one dataset.  
In a lengthy manual process, matches were built, these matches are based on the property ID 
and the corresponding date. Every time a property was transacted more than two times in the 
total dataset the multiple matched transactions were recorded to measure the change in price 
for every additional transaction. Additionally, a variable measuring the log price change 
between the first and second sale was created and a variable measuring the time difference 
between the first and the second transaction in years. To measure the impact of insolvencies 
on street level one variable was created, the variable is a count of insolvencies, defined as sales 
via execution remissions in the same street in the year, preceding the recorded transaction. The 
final transformed dataset consists of 62,797 residential transactions with prices and 316 
variables, of which 230 were newly created, the summary statistics of the most important 
variables can be found in in appendix B. When calculating returns for the matches, while 
including multiple transactions of the same property by calculating the returns between each 
known transaction, one finds 39,893 returns based on the previously identified matches. When 
looking at the different price distributions, we can see that all kinds of transactions show a 
heavy right skewness (figure 1). Campbell et al. (2011) found in their research the same 
characteristic right skewness of foreclosure sales, which is prevalent in the dataset used in this 
thesis, with having most foreclosure sales between the value of 15 to 9,115 Gulden but having 
a very long tail with the largest foreclosure sale of 103,000 Gulden. In total the dataset consists 
of 5,330 sales via execution remission, which represents 8.49% of all transactions in the 
sample. 
It can be seen that execution remissions are more concentrated in the extremes, as one can see 
that the share of transactions within the highest and lowest transaction value bracket is higher 
than the share of transactions within these value brackets of all other forms of transactions. 
When comparing the distribution of foreclosure sales and normal sales, one can see that 
foreclosure sales are much more concentrated in the low-value bracket than normal sales. That 
confirms previous findings that foreclosures concentrate on low-value properties (Li 2017), 
while this makes intuitive sense, as people who purchase residential real estate that is cheaper 
might often have lower income and fewer savings and hence are more exposed to changes in 
income and consequently the economic conditions. The higher concentration of foreclosure 
transactions in very high property value real estate’s is puzzling. It might be explained through 
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the smaller amount of foreclosure sale transactions, and an unusual high amount of rare high-
value property foreclosures. This seems unlikely though through the length of the total sample. 
Another reason might be the emergence of financial products and the financing of high-risk 
ventures via financial products, here a later example will show that members of very wealthy 
families engaged in high-risk business ventures and eventually defaulted after longer periods 
of financial struggle defaulted on a massive scale. This period specific phenomenon might 
explain this above-average concentration of foreclosure sales in high the value bracket.  
 
 
In terms of data quality one can see that the data until 1644 is very limited, often with less than 
100 transactions per year but after 1644 the data quality improves significantly with an average 
number of 167 transactions and a maximum of 683 transactions in 1765. This might be driven 
by the share of registers that are preserved until today but seems relevant in terms of 
conclusions that can be drawn on data preceding 1644. Looking at the share of insolvencies 
per year one can see that the share of insolvencies increases when the share of transactions 
decreases (figure 2), this is driven by a decrease in absolute transactions combined with an 
increase of absolute foreclosures. Figure 2 and figure 3 also reflect the cycles in the real estate 
market of Amsterdam, from 1700 one can identify 2 major periods of crisis in the residential 
real estate market when looking at the share of insolvencies relative to yearly transactions. The 
first crisis after 1700 seems to occur around 1740, this co-occurs with a lengthy recession 
described by de Vries and van der Woude (2007). The second major real estate crisis can be 
seen after 1794 which was during the fourth Anglo-Dutch war and the connected detrimental 
Figure 1: Overview over relative share of transactions per transaction procedure in different real estate value ranges 
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effects on European trade, which severely harmed the Dutch economy during that period. 
These crises are also reflected in the price development, when plotting median prices, to avoid 
the noises of averages, we can see that the real estate crises, that have been identified using the 
share of foreclosure sales on total sales, co-occur with the end of continued real estate price 
declines. In addition to that, we can see the tendency of foreclosure sales to be concentrated at 
the extremes of price ranges during a period due to the high standard deviation of median forced 
prices when comparing them to the median unforced prices (figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Annual median prices of total sales, forced sales and unforced sales 
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To analyze whether the different distribution of foreclosure sales might be procedurally 
induced by for example a monthly concentration of foreclosure auctions which would expose 
foreclosure sales to other monthly effects than regular sales, the distribution of monthly 
occurrence of foreclosure sales was plotted in figure 4. This distribution reveals that foreclosure 
auctions have not been taken place in specific months as no monthly concentration can be 
found in the data. Hence we cannot explain the higher standard deviation or the higher 
skewness of foreclosure prices via monthly effects or sales concentrations that might have 
affected the purchase behavior of real estate investors and homeowners.  
When looking at further variables present in the dataset one can draw interesting conclusions 
on individual investor behavior during the sample period, which can be used to describe and 
explain the previously described characteristic of the real estate market and certain sub-
dynamics within the residential real estate market especially in times before and after 
foreclosures or crises, for that purpose two samples were created.  
The first sample is a list of the 50 persons with the highest accumulated value of default 
transactions as a seller. The 50 largest sales from execution remissions accumulate to 1,915,462 
Gulden, have an average transaction value of 38,309 and a median transaction value 34,100 
which reconfirms the right skewness of execution remissions. At a later stage, this data will be 
used to gain a deeper understanding of what kind of people foreclosed large amounts, what 
they foreclosed and how the process affected their behavior in the overall market.  
The second sample identifies a residential real estate market crisis from 1743 to 1751, this 
seems surprising as de Vries and van der Woude (2007) find that in 1742 the per capita GDP 
(Gross domestic product) was at was at the end of a long period of decline after the economic 
Figure 4: Monthly distribution of foreclosure sales over the full sample period 
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peak of 1650 this means that the crisis, defined by the above average share of insolvencies on 
total transactions, co-occurs with an economic upswing. A period of ten years before and ten 
years after the crisis is defined and used to identify structural changes, like the average 
transaction price but also use the data to identify the most active people in the residential real 
estate market before and after the crisis and see how the behavior changed. 
5. Non-time variant foreclosure discounts  
 
5.1. Methodology 
In order to identify foreclosure discounts in the samples an extended repeat-sales methodology 
is used, which is based on Bailey et al. (1963) and Case and Shiller (1987). This was done to 
reflect the nature of the dataset, that despite the sample size has little to no data which could 
be used in a hedonic regression opposed to the dataset that is used by Immergluck and Smith 
(2006). In addition to that Harding et al. (2009) argue that the repeat sales approach 
substantially reduced the omitted variable problem of hedonic models and is compatible to 
identify separate effects of the overall price trend.  
The model is based on the standard repeat sales model and extends it by a term for the 
transaction type. It defines that a transaction price of a home i in a year t can be separated in 
the following characteristics: 
!"# = %" + '" + (# + *"#                       (1) %" represents the quality of a home and is assumed to be time invariant. '" represents dummies 
for the type of sale and (# represents the monthly seasonality while *"# captures remaining 
transaction noise. Korevaar (2018) used additionally the term +# to capture the current level of 
market prices via an interest rate parameter. Taking log differences, the return of a home i 
between time t and s can be written as follows: 
,"# − ,". =  /"# − /". + 0# −0. + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;)    (2) 
The equation gets estimated for all pairs using OLS, where the time period in years, the type 
of sale and the transaction month are identified by dummy variables for each period, type or 
month. In order to reflect the nature of differencing, the dummy variables take the value one in 
period t and the value minus one in periods. Regular sales in January 1510 are taken as the 
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baseline for further estimations. Heteroskedasticity, which might arise through holding period 
differences, is controlled via the Case and Shiller (1987) adjustment, this is done for every 
regression that is based on a repeat sales approach in this thesis. 
To address the concern that the combination of foreclosure sales drive foreclosure discounts, 
consequently that investors who buy houses from foreclosures to sell them via normal sales 
procedures and profit from that behavior, a set of dummies was created that controls for the 
different possibilities of including execution remissions in a transaction. While the standard 
model would identify two consecutive foreclosure sales as zero in the variable for foreclosure 
sales, I explicitly model this opportunity as a dummy which is one if both sales are foreclosure 
sales and zero if they are not, in the same way, the other two opportunities are modeled.  
,"# − ,". =  =".>3"# + >3".&"# + ="#>3". + / "# − / ". + 0# − 0. + 1"# − 1".,  3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;)           (3) 
,where =". represents a not forced sale, >3"# represents a forced sale and the combination from 
both [=".>3"# and ="#>3".] represent in accordance to the time periods the different points in 
time and / represents the dummies for the remaining transaction forms. This leads to a clear 
identification of the impact of each possible combination on the price difference. From these 
combinations, I can draw conclusions on the quality of a home, by the realization of premiums 
or discounts in every possible combination. When I am able to realize structural premiums by 
acquiring foreclosed properties and selling them via normal sales procedures an explanation of 
the foreclosure effect by fundamentally worse quality is unlikely because when quality is 
discounted in a foreclosure process it should be discounted in a normal sales process, too. 
Hence no premium should be realized in this combination. 
This procedure is supported by a microdata level analysis that covers the behavior of investors 
before and after the residential real estate market crisis from 1743 to 1751. Therefore investors 
were listed and ranked based on their transaction activity within 10 years after the end of the 
crisis in 1751. The behavior was analyzed analog to the analysis that was done for the people 
with the highest foreclosing values, for the 20 most active market participants measured by an 
absolute count of sales in the period after the crisis. This analysis offers interesting insights on 
whether the most active real estate investors used foreclosure sales to generate returns by 
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buying via foreclosure sales in the crisis and selling of the acquired assets after crisis via normal 
sales procedures to maximize profits. 
 
5.2. Results 
In table 1 one can see the results of the adjusted repeat sales regressions. Interestingly enough 
one can see that over the full sample period no significant foreclosure discount can be found.    
This implies high market efficiency in the real estate market of Amsterdam during that time 
period. The overall results are in line with Harding et al. (2012) who state that the existence of 
a structural foreclosure discount would represent an arbitrage opportunity. This also confirms 
the findings of Boerner et al. (2012) who find that the Anglo-Dutch premium auction solves a 
Table 1: Regression results foreclosure discount 
Formula 2: ,"# − ,". =  /"# − /". + 0# − 0. + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;), with EXKWS being the transaction type 
dummy for foreclosure sales, WD being the transaction type dummy for willige decreeten and WMRS being the dummy 
for orphan sales. Not reported here are all yearly and monthly dummies, as they are control variables. 
Formula 3: ,"# − ,". =  =".>3"# + >3".&"# + ="#>3". + / "# − / ". +  0# −0. + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;), with 
EXKWS_1 NORM_2 being the dummy for houses that were purchased via foreclosure sales and sold via normal sales, 
EXKWS BOTH being the dummy for houses that were bought and sold via foreclosure sales and NORM_1 EXKWS_2 
Being the dummy for houses that were bought via normal sales procedures and sold via foreclosure sales. Not reported 
here are all yearly and monthly dummies, as they are control variables. Both regression results present the result after the 
Case and Shiller (1987) adjustment for heteroskedasticity.  
Formula (2) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3)
Variable EXKWS WD WMRS WD WMRS
EXKWS_1 
NORM_2
EXKWS 
BOTH
NORM_1_
EXKWS_2
Coefficient -0.004713 0.010373 0.017998 0.010353 0.018285 -0.012231 0.000450 -0.012027
Std. Error 0.003264 0.006069 0.010355 0.006069 0.010361 0.005414 0.004054 0.013331
z-Statistic -1.444059 1.709354 1.738013 1.705904 1.764836 -2.258987 0.111106 -0.902201
Prob.  0.1487 0.0874 0.0822 0.0880 0.0776 0.0239 0.9115 0.3669
Weighted Statistics
Mean dependent var -4.11E-07 -4.11E-07
Sum squared resid 2,119 2,119
Akaike info criterion -0.105685 -0.105680
Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.090136 -0.089994
Deviance statistic 0.051464 0.051462
Pearson statistic 0.051464 0.051462
    S.D. dependent var 0.312756 0.312746
    Log likelihood 2,336 2,338
    Schwarz criterion -0.056567 -0.056131
    Deviance 2,041 2,041
    Pearson SSR 2,041 2,041
    Dispersion 0.051464 0.051462
Unweighted Statistics
Mean dependent var -0.014261 -0.014261
    S.D. dependent var 0.297361 0.297361
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complex market problem. This means that the residential real estate market was, contrary to 
my initial hypothesis, very efficient and apparently exhibited a higher degree of efficiency than 
many real estate markets nowadays.  
Looking at the findings of previous literature one central characteristic of the residential real 
estate market in Amsterdam during the sample period might influence the magnitude of the 
foreclosure discount. During the sample period, the city of Amsterdam experienced strong 
population growth induced by the economic success of the Dutch Republic and Amsterdam in 
particular (van der Woude 1982). This means that the city had to find housing to cater the needs 
of a strongly increasing population, which induced an increase in the level of demand and due 
to the inelasticity of supply Amsterdam should experience an overall price appreciation over 
large parts of the sample period. When this characteristic is combined with the findings of Zhou 
et al. (2015), who find a negative correlation between the magnitude of foreclosure discounts 
and real estate price appreciation, the lack of significance of the foreclosure discount 
throughout the full sample period makes intuitive sense. As a discount of 0.4% can be found 
but is not statistically significant I investigate at a later point the time variance of foreclosure 
discounts. A secondary finding of the first equation is the significant premium paid for willige 
decreeten over the full sample period should reflect decreased risks. When comparing the 
transaction of willige decreeten with the regular transactions, where housing purchasers were 
exposed to the remaining risk of residual claims from previous creditors, one can intuitively 
see why transactions via willige decreeten exhibit less exposure to risk than normal 
transactions and hence should realize a premium. 
While the small, statistical insignificant foreclosure discount, makes intuitive sense given the 
characteristics of the sample period and the corresponding procedures, the question about the 
drivers of such foreclosure discounts remains open. Analyzing the argument that foreclosure 
discounts are driven by the underlying quality of the transacted property, the impact of different 
sales procedure combination on the change in price was controlled.  
 
The results show that properties that are transacted first via foreclosure sales and then via 
normal sales are realizing 1.2% lower returns than other combinations, with all other 
combinations not yielding statistically significant results. This is in line with previous findings 
which find that foreclosure discounts are negatively correlated to the underlying properties 
quality (Zhou et al. 2015), as houses which were bought via foreclosure and sold via a normal 
27 
 
procedures generate lower returns than houses that were bought via normal procedures and 
sold via normal procedures, the sales price has to be lower as the previous analysis did not 
identify a consistent foreclosure discount. Hence the lower return is caused by a structurally 
lower sales price in the normal procedure which ceteris paribus implies a lower quality of the 
underlying transacted property. 
To confirm this hypothesis a second analysis was done on the micro level of the existing 
dataset, the assumption was, when foreclosed properties are characterized by lower quality 
professional real estate investors, identified by the number of real estate transactions, should 
refrain from acquiring significant holdings in foreclosed real estate. Because they would know 
that the lower quality is reflected by offering a significant discount and following normal sales 
will discount the quality too, unless the lack of maintenance is resolved, which is going to 
require additional investments. The counter-hypothesis is when there is no quality difference 
investors should buy foreclosed properties to generate a risk-free profit. In order to verify this 
assumption a period of crisis was chosen, where a foreclosure discount has been identified in 
the previous analysis. 
 
Microdata level analysis – investor behavior during and after the real estate crisis from 1743 
to 1751 
 
Most investors that sold significant amounts of real estate properties in the first 10 years after 
1751 bought most properties before the crisis and left the real estate market for the duration of 
the crisis. An example of that is Jan van Gelder. Jan van Gelder was a shopkeeper who 
transacted in total 31 properties, he bought only 6 properties during the crisis and after the 
crisis, he bought 10 properties while selling 13 properties. Cors Schouten was another 
significant real estate investor who bought 18 properties, only 2 of them were bought via 
insolvency sales. His brother, Claas Schouten bought 13 properties, most of which were bought 
via normal sales procedures in the crisis. The same pattern continues, big real estate investors 
seem to have refrained as far as possible from buying properties from foreclosure transactions. 
This is a strong indicator for a quality difference between foreclosed properties and regular sale 
properties, this might arise due to the preceding time of financial difficulties which owner of 
houses in a foreclosing process face which would be in line with the argumentation of Zhou et 
al. (2015). While this could also be the result of very little market liquidity and low willingness 
to engage in transactions, I believe the fact that real estate investors, which are on the one hand 
heavily negative affected by the crisis in the real estate market, but on the other hand are very 
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wealthy do barely engage into real estate transactions might be explainable by the low 
willingness to engage in transaction. I think that the pattern that the same investors engage in 
normal transactions, while having the choice to engage in other foreclosure transactions is a 
clear indicator for a structural quality difference. This argument is strengthened by the fact that 
homeowners are often not willing to sell their properties at a loss (Genesove and Mayer 2001) 
and hence the access to houses that are sold via normal transactions, should be assumed to be 
more difficult than the access of forced sales in times of real estate market crisis. When this 
aspect is assumed to be true, the individual investor behavior is another argument for the lower 
than average quality of foreclosed properties. It should be mentioned that this quality difference 
is most likely a function of missing maintenance and other factors that are used to keep the 
quality level of a property as fundamental quality criteria such as the location, the size and kind 
of property are addressed in the repeat sales methodology. This also makes intuitive sense as a 
residential real estate foreclosure is usually the last resort after a long period of financial 
distress, in this time the average property owner is assumed to reduce costs as far as possible 
to avoid a default. A possible way to reduce costs is to delay required maintenance on the 
property, which would result in a deteriorating quality of the property which is not captured by 
the traditional repeat-sales method. 
 
To summarize the findings the residential real estate market in Amsterdam has been very 
efficient over the full sample period which is in line with the argumentation that the high 
foreclosure discounts found in previous literature of about 20% (Pennington-Cross 2004; 
Campbell et al. 2011; Clauretie and Daneshvary 2009) are most likely caused by omitted 
variable biases as argued by Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009) and Carroll et al. (1997), who 
both argue that that high foreclosure discounts, are counterintuitive under the assumption of 
efficient markets as significant foreclosure discounts would represent an arbitrage opportunity.  
That no such arbitrage opportunity exists is not only argued by Harding et al. (2012) but can 
also be seen in the individual investor behavior, where the largest real estate investors do not 
make use of the existing foreclosure discounts, which is most probably to be explained by 
below average quality of foreclosed homes (Clauretie and Daneshvary 2009; Sumell 2009), 
that is also reflected in the significant negative coefficient of the combination foreclosure sale 
with subsequent normal sale. Here I hypothesize that the quality difference results of a lack of 
maintenance as this deteriorating quality effect is not captured by the quantitative methodology 
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and makes intuitive sense when respecting the financial situation of debtors preceding a 
residential real estate foreclosure. 
6. Time-variant foreclosure discounts  
In order to verify the assumption of efficient residential real estate markets during the sample 
period, when measuring efficiency by the magnitude of the foreclosure discount I analyze the 
time variation of potential foreclosure discounts. That might arise because foreclosure 
discounts might be affected by the rising prices (figure 3; Zhou et al. 2015) during the strong 
inhabitant increase in Amsterdam (van der Woude 1982). While this strong inhabitant increase 
might dominate the effect over the full sample period, multiple residential real estate crises 
with falling prices were identified, which might have caused rising foreclosure discounts and 
consequently time variation. 
6.1.  Methodology 
Time variation of foreclosure discounts is tested via the inclusion of multiple interaction 
variables that replace the term for execution remissions in the formula. The formula changes 
to:   
,"# − ,". =  >3"# ∗ 5# − >3". ∗ 5. + / "# − / ". +  0# − 0. + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;) (4) 
,with 5# being a dummy for 5 defined time periods and / # being the dummy for the remaining 
forms of transactions. The dummy is build-up like in a classic repeat sales design and interacts 
with a dummy that is one when the respective transaction occurred within the defined 
timeframe. This allows identifying foreclosure discounts in the chosen time periods while 
preserving the data quality and hence the statistical significance. To identify time variance in 
general, I started in 1601 and distributed the time intervals in 50-year steps, with the last step 
being a bit shorter. I use this very basic time intervals to develop an idea about the drivers of 
foreclosure discounts by comparing the results of the regression with descriptive statistics of 
the respective time intervals.  
As this initial regression will deliver some puzzling results, which might be explained by the 
strong skewness of the foreclosure transactions in the sample (figure 1) and the behavior of 
individuals with very large foreclosures, a list of the 50 people with the highest values of 
cumulative foreclosure sales was created based on the microdata of the sample. The list was 
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checked for famous investors and personalities and subsequently, for all persons listed in this 
sample, a transaction history was created. This transaction history was checked for patterns 
with respect to purchasing behavior before the foreclosure, average transaction size, amount of 
foreclosed properties relative to owned properties and the activity in the real estate market after 
the foreclosures. This was done to analyze how people who were significantly impacted by 
foreclosure sales behaved subsequently in the market. 
In a second step I use the insights gained from the previous analysis to analyze the drivers of 
foreclosure discounts in the sample period, as the foreclosure process remains constant I rule 
out an impact of changing institutions, the same is assumed for fundamental qualitative 
differences as these are controlled for in the same way throughout the full sample period. 
Consequently, possible time-variation has to be market driven, either in a direct supply and 
demand relation or in an indirect form, where changes in supply and demand relations, increase 
the importance of other decisive factors, such as the maintenance status of the property. To 
generalize I hypothesize that two factors drive foreclosure discounts, the general state of the 
housing market, measured by price as the best indicator for the current demand-supply 
relationship and the amount of foreclosures relative to total properties, as Korevaar (2018) 
finds that the 17th century had a very active mortgage market, hence there are relatively more 
foreclosures during that period, which might impact the foreclosure discount by significant 
supply and demand imbalances. 
To incorporate these two explanatory terms, two interaction terms are added in the repeat sales 
formula (2), that results in: 
,"# − ,". =  "# − ". + >3"# − >3". + / "# − / ". + ("# ∗ >3"#) − (". ∗ >3".) + (>3"# ∗ *#5$#) −(>3". ∗ *#5$.) + 0# − 0. + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;)               (5) 
,with b reflecting the state of the market in the year t and s respectively defined as standardized 
median price with the respective year, >3 being a traditional repeat sales variable for execution 
remissions at the time t and s, / being a set of dummy variables for all other forms of 
transactions and exto being a measure of execution remissions per year divided by the number 
of unique properties in the sample at times t and s interacted with the dummy for foreclosure 
sales >3. In addition to that, the variable for the state of the market b interacts with the dummy 
for foreclosure sales. All variables described above are differenced according to their states at 
time t and s to reflect the repeat sales procedure. This formula allows isolating the impact of 
31 
 
changes in market price levels and changes in the relative share of foreclosures on the 
foreclosure discounts.  
6.2.  Results 
 
The analysis reveals significant time variation of foreclosure discounts across the sample 
period. This is in line with the findings of (Li 2017), who states that the magnitude of 
foreclosure discounts is smaller in times of price appreciation, which is tested for this sample 
in a second step.  
This analysis identifies significant foreclosure-related price impacts for three periods, from 
1701 until 1750 a significant premium of 1.5% over normal transaction was paid for properties, 
from 1751 until 1800 a significant foreclosure discount of 2.8% can be found and from 1800 
until 1811 the foreclosure discount increased to 3.5%. 
Table 2: Regression results foreclosure discount 
Formula 4: ,"# − ,". =  >3"# ∗ 5# − >3". ∗ 5. + / "# − / ". +  0# − 0. + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;), with 
EXKWS_1601_1650 representing the standard repeat sales coefficient for foreclosure sales (in the formula represented 
as >3"#) in the time frame from 1601 till 1650. EXKWS_1651_1700 representing the standard repeat sales coefficient 
for foreclosure sales (in the formula represented as >3"# and −>3". respectively) in the time frame from 1651till 1700. 
This is continued for the additional EXKWS dummies. In addition, I report the results for the other forms of transaction 
procedures as described before. Not reported here are all yearly and monthly dummies, as they are control variables. 
The regression results present the result after the Case and Shiller (1987) adjustment for heteroskedasticity. 
Formula (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4)
Variable
EXKWS 
1601_1650
EXKWS 
1651_1700
EXKWS 
1701_1750
EXKWS 
1801_1800
EXKWS 
1801_1811 WD WMRS
Coefficient -0.017781 0.007486 0.014634 -0.027756 -0.035156 0.013612 0.016228
Std. Error 0.013140 0.005459 0.006296 0.006940 0.009509 0.006146 0.010820
z-Statistic -1.353178 1.371311 2.324357 -3.999212 -3.69715 2.214857 1.499805
Prob.  0.1760 0.1703 0.0201 0.0001 0.0002 0.0268 0.1337
Weighted Statistics
Mean dependent var -4.11E-07
Sum squared resid 2,117
Akaike info criterion -0.106414
Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.090592
Deviance statistic 0.051426
Pearson statistic 0.051426
    S.D. dependent var 0.312700
    Log likelihood 2,355
    Schwarz criterion -0.056434
    Deviance 2,040
    Pearson SSR 2,040
    Dispersion 0.051426
Unweighted Statistics
Mean dependent var -0.014261
    S.D. dependent var 0.297361
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1701 until 1750 
The approximate premium of 1.5% for houses sold via foreclosure sales seems puzzling as it 
is contrary to all previously found literature. In order to understand this premium, the data was 
analyzed at its micro level, when doing that one can see that the sample period shows a constant 
decrease in share of foreclosure sales relative to other sales until 1740 at the end of a lasting 
deflationary period, the number of foreclosures, the relative share of foreclosure transactions 
on total transactions increased sharply while the number of total transactions decreased. The 
timing of this residential real estate “crisis” is puzzling as de Vries and van der Woude (2007) 
identified 1742 as the turning point of the Dutch economy, where it turned from a decrease into 
slight growth de Vries and van der Woude (2007) calculated for the Dutch economy in 1742 a 
gross national product (GNP) between 265 and 280 million guilders, or 135–142 guilders GNP 
per capita, which grows according to their calculations to 307 million guilders, or 162 guilders 
per capita in the decade of 1800 to 1810.  
 
Microdata level analysis – major foreclosures and the example of Theodorus Fries 
 
Checking the individual years, one can see that some years are despite a low amount of 
foreclosure sales characterized by very large sums which are paid for houses in foreclosure 
sales, for example on the 11. June of 1745 the house and brewery of Theodorus Fries were 
auctioned off for 103,000 Gulden. In the same year, a property on the Herengracht was 
foreclosed for 78,000 Gulden. These two transactions represent the largest transactions via 
foreclosure sales in the full sample. This pattern is repeated over other years of the emerging 
crisis, a possible explanation is that some rich family members used the emergence of financial 
instruments to leverage their ventures and utilize the upswing of the economy. This might have 
gone wrong in multiple cases which leads to foreclosure of very expensive properties which 
might now face the same foreclosure dynamics as the “average” property. The underlying 
explanation is confirmed when looking into the behavior of Theodorus Fries in the real estate 
market and his history. Theodorus Fries, who was married to Cornelia de Clercq had gone 
bankrupt for the first time in 1727, as a merchant in the Baltic Sea,  with a debt of over 274,000 
guilders. He settled with his creditors by repaying 10% of the total outstanding sum (Stichting 
Familiearchief de Clercq 2018). After that he bought in 1731 the brewery De Hooiberg, using 
debt financing with an annual amount of 5,000 guilders to be paid for the next 5 years and after 
that larger amounts at his discretion. To refinance his debt he borrowed from additional parties, 
including his own family, 30,000 guilders. From 1736 he continually had to borrow additional 
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money to keep up with his financial obligations. In 1745 he went bankrupt again with creditors 
claiming more than 225,000 guilders (Stichting Familiearchief de Clercq 2018; van Eeghen 
1958). The large foreclosure sale in the sample is part of this second bankruptcy. This example 
shows how well-established families were able to accumulate significant debt financing to 
pursue their ventures and how these materialized in some cases. When excluding the largest 
5% of foreclosures, in terms of transaction value, in a robustness check the premium loses its 
significance (not reported here). 
 
1751 until 1800 
The period covered in this coefficient represents a time of economic expansion in the Dutch 
economy, this materializes by a low relative share of foreclosure transactions ranging in 
between 0% and 4% per year in the times excluding the crises at the beginning as described 
above and at the end of the time period (figure 2). The previously described economic 
expansion starting in 1742 and ending 1780 is reflected by these low shares of foreclosure 
sales. The start of the fourth Anglo-Dutch war in 1780 resulted into trade decreasing rapidly 
and challenging the Dutch economy another time, with the proclamation of the Batavian 
Republic in 1795 (Schama 2005) and the resulting transfer payments to France made the state 
unable to intervene with reforms. This resulted in a wide economic crisis which continued 
through the French annexation (1810) and the proclamation of the United Kingdom of the 
Netherlands (1815), until 1850. The result of the war and the economic crisis are reflected in 
the data on the residential real estate market, from 1780 one can see a continued rise of 
foreclosure sales resulting in a 13% share of foreclosure sales on all sales in 1800.  
The significant foreclosure discount of 2.8% is in line with the results of previous research and 
confirms the remarks of Li (2017) because, while we experienced in the previous time periods 
of the sample flat or rising residential real estate prices, this period shows an overall decrease 
of residential real estate prices over the full time-period (figure 3), hence the expected increase 
of foreclosure discounts due to market price depreciation materializes. 
 
1801 until 1811 
The foreclosure discount of 3.5% represents an increase of the foreclosure discount which co-
occurs with worsening economic conditions. Residential real estate prices continued to fall 
during the period (figure 3), interestingly this does not decrease the sales activity in the market 
as the year 1809 is the year with most transactions recorded. In general, this result seems to be 
in line with the argumentation of Andersen and Nielsen (2017), who argue that the financial 
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situation and the current market developments are driving the magnitude of foreclosure 
discounts. As it can be reasonably assumed that the financial conditions of foreclosure sellers 
are worsening in times of economic distress and market conditions were deteriorating too, what 
can be seen in the drastically falling median price of residential properties in Amsterdam 
(figure 3), the rise of foreclosure discounts in times of economic and residential real estate 
crises seems intuitive. 
 
To summarize the results of the check for time variation, it can be said that during the sample 
period there has been time variation of foreclosure discounts which is in line with previous 
literature (Aroul and Hansz 2014; Li 2017; Zhou et al. 2015). The foreclosure discounts seem 
to be driven by general real estate price behavior as the extent of significance and absolute 
magnitude increases in times of residential real estate crisis, with depreciating residential real 
estate values. The magnitude of foreclosure discounts is in line with the research of Clauretie 
and Daneshvary (2009), who oppose prior research and state that foreclosure discounts of 20% 
are caused by omitted variable induced upward biases.  
The time variation and the magnitude of the foreclosure discount enable interesting 
conclusions, first: the residential real estate market in Amsterdam during the golden ages and 
their subsequent decline seem to not have been less efficient than the real estate markets today, 
due to the wide range of foreclosure discounts (Zhou et al. 2015), but as the magnitude is close 
to the lower band of estimations assuming at least an equal degree of efficiency seems 
reasonable. The time variation might also explain the different findings in prior literature, as 
time variation in relatively efficient markets imposes a significant sample selection bias risk 
which might explain in part the previous variability in estimates. 
 
In order to explain the identified time variation, I analyze the impact of the general state of the 
housing market, measured by price as the best indicator for the current demand and supply 
relationships and the number of foreclosures relative to total properties. The results of this 
regression are highly insignificant and while the interaction variable which shows the effect of 
changes of the general price level makes sense, as it shows that the foreclosure discount 
decreases with increasing property prices, it is statistically highly insignificant. Despite the 
statistical insignificance the coefficient seems to be in line with the findings of previous 
literature (Li 2017). 
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The high statistical insignificance of the relation between foreclosure discounts and the share 
of foreclosures relative to total properties makes the high coefficient of the interaction variable 
of foreclosure sales and the share of foreclosures impossible to interpret. All things considered 
the results of this very basic analysis are not significant and hence cannot be reliably used for 
an interpretation, this might be driven by the very basic definition of both added variables or 
the lack of significance on the price of foreclosure sales in general when assessing the 
Formula (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5)
Variable EXKWS WD WMRS
EXKWS_X_
EXTO
EXKWS_X_
STAN_PLE
VEL
STAN_PLE
VEL
Coefficient -0.012609 0.010103 0.015585 3.595049 0.000194 0.014653
Std. Error 0.007523 0.006076 0.010368 4.453561 0.00505 0.001778
z-Statistic -1.675996 1.66284 1.503248 0.80723 0.038509 8.239016
Prob.  0.0937 0.0963 0.1328 0.4195 0.9693 0
Weighted Statistics
Mean dependent var -4.12E-07
Sum squared resid 2,116
Akaike info criterion -0.107302
Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.091548
Deviance statistic 0.051366
Pearson statistic 0.051366
    S.D. dependent var 0.312884
    Log likelihood 2,371
    Schwarz criterion -0.057537
    Deviance 2,037
    Pearson SSR 2,037
    Dispersion 0.051366
Unweighted Statistics
Mean dependent var -0.014261
    S.D. dependent var 0.297361
Table 3: Regression results foreclosure discount 
Formula 5: ,"# − ,". =  "# − ". + >3"# − >3". + / "# − / ". + ("# ∗ >3"#) − (". ∗ >3".) + (>3"# ∗ *#5$#) − (>3". ∗*#5$.) + 0# − 0. + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;), with EXKWS representing the standard repeat sales coefficient for 
foreclosure sales (in the formula represented as >3"# − >3".) In addition I report the results for the other forms of 
transaction procedures as described before. STAN_PLEVEL represents the standardized market price level (measured 
as standardized median price over the full sample period) in the respective year (in the formula represented as "# − ".). 
This term is interacted with the standard repeat sales term for foreclosure transactions, to assess the impact of the 
standardized market price level on the foreclosure discount. The second interaction term interacts the standard repeat 
sales term for foreclosure transactions with the share of foreclosure transactions on total sample properties (in the 
formula represented as *#5$# and −*#5$. respectively). Not reported here are all yearly and monthly dummies, as they 
are control variables. The regression results present are the result after the Case and Shiller (1987) adjustment for 
heteroskedasticity. 
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foreclosure discount over the full sample period. Due to the time limitation of this master thesis, 
the explanation of the identified time variation remains subject to further research and might 
help to significantly enhance the understanding of the dynamics of foreclosure discounts. 
 
While the overall market seems to be efficient, the found time variation can partly be explained 
by the skewness of foreclosures which led in part to a foreclosure premium from 1701 till 1750, 
but also by the price behavior of the overall market, as Aroul and Hansz (2014) argue that 
foreclosure discounts depend on the price volatility of the overall residential real estate 
markets. This is also supported by the argument of Zhou et al. (2015), who argue that 
foreclosure discounts are negatively related to housing price appreciations. This makes sense 
not only when looking at the house price appreciation and the occurrence of significant 
foreclosure discounts, but is confirmed when looking at the historical context. Significant 
foreclosure discounts co-occur with crises in the economy, which are reflected in falling 
housing prices. As the beginning of the sample period is characterized by a large population 
increase (van der Woude 1982) and hence rising prices for residential real estate, due to the 
higher demand elasticity relative to the supply elasticity in residential real estate. Insignificant 
foreclosure discounts follow from the arising demand overhang, that implies that the utility of 
additional available housing exceeds the disutility of the lower than average housing quality, 
which might be caused by a lack of maintenance. In the times of the economic decline of the 
Netherlands, which defines the second part of the sample period, the demand as limited as only 
very wealthy people can acquire real estate when unemployment rises as a consequence of 
lower economic output. This limited demand might be the reason for rising inefficiencies in 
the market which materialize in rising foreclosure discounts.  
7. Spillover effects of foreclosure discounts  
 
As I identified significant foreclosure discounts in certain subperiods, I want to investigate the 
presence of spillover effects of these foreclosures on neighboring properties. As spillover 
effects are of major importance in the transmission of real estate market crises to the real 
economy. This reflects the central concern about foreclosure discount and major reason for 
governmental intervention in real estate crises, due to the negative externalities of decreasing 
house prices on the economies real activity, such as residential investment and consumer 
demand (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Krishnamurthy 2003, 2009; Lorenzoni 2008; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1992). 
37 
 
7.1. Methodology 
In order to assess the impact of neighboring foreclosures on the price of an individual house 
formula (1) is extended: 
!"# = %" + '" + (# + %"#&' + *"#           (6) 
The term %"#&' is the count of insolvencies in the previous year in the same street. When 
determining the log difference between the price of the matched pairs the following equation 
emerges. ,"# − ,". =  /"# − /". + 0# −0. + %"#&' − %".&' + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;)  (7) 
The data shows significant skewness in the street length which might affect the significance of 
the impact of foreclosures on a street level due to the wide geographical dispersion of houses. 
On long streets, which enter the sample with a proportionally higher amount of transactions 
when compared with smaller streets, one can expect a decreasing impact of neighboring 
foreclosures due to the increasing geographic distance between properties. To initially control 
this hypothesis a dummy for street size was included. Due to the heavy skew of property IDs 
per street, the 40 largest streets, defined by the unique count of property IDs per street, are 
tested via a dummy variable. This dummy variable interacts with the foreclosure count on the 
street level. This results in: 
,"# − ,". =  / "# − / ". +  0# −0. + (%"#&' ∗ +()40+5,"# − %".&' ∗ +()40+5,".) + (%"#&' ∗=+()40+5,"# − %".&' ∗ =+()40+5,".) + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;)   (8) 
,where the term Big40Str represents a dummy that is one for transactions that occur in the 40 
largest streets and zero otherwise while the term nBig40Str is a dummy that is one for 
transactions that do not occur in the 40 largest streets and zero otherwise. As these dummies 
interact with the defaults in the same street on the previous year it disentangles the effect of 
foreclosures in the previous year on the 40 largest streets and the rest of streets on the price 
change. 
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As an additional step I analyze the impact of increasing street sizes by including an interaction 
variable between street size and previous year foreclosures in formula (7), this leads to: 
,"# − ,". =  /"# − /". + 0# −0. + (%"#&' ∗ +5,-*="# − %".&' ∗ +5,-*=".) + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5,1~7(0, :;)           (9) 
,here the term StrLen represents the length of a street measured by the number of unique 
properties in the sample on the specific street. This allows to test the hypothesis whether 
spillover effects are a local effect, as in this case with an increasing size of the street spillover 
effects should become smaller, what would be reflected in the added interaction term. 
To control for time variance interaction variables were included in the formula similar to the 
inclusion of time-dependent dummy as an interaction term in formula (3). This results in the 
following formula: 
,"# − ,". =  / "# − / ". +  0# −0. + (%"#&' ∗ 5# − %".&' ∗ 5.) + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;)
                     (10) 
Additionally, the same variables were regressed on the residuals of formula (2) in a two-stage 
estimation process: 
,"# − ,". =  /"# − /". + 0# −0. + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;)    (2) 
This results in the following three formulas: 
1 = %"#&' − %".&' + . + 1"# − 1".                   (11) 1 = (%"#&' ∗ 5# − %".&' ∗ 5.) + . + 1"# − 1".                 (12) 1 = (%"#&' ∗ +5,-*=# − %".&' ∗ +5,-*=.) + . + 1"# − 1".                (13) 
This represents a simple extension of the OLS method that rules out any noise from a 
correlation of the dependent variable’s error terms with the independent variables. Hence this 
additional process rules out endogeneity problems in the previous regressions. 
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7.2. Results 
 
The spillover effect is analyzed via isolating the effect of insolvencies in the same street in the 
previous year. On the full sample, I find a significant negative spillover effect of foreclosure 
sales of -0.33% per insolvency in the same street. While the identification of significant 
spillover effects is in line with previous literature (Daneshvary et al. 2011; Harding et al. 2009; 
Immergluck and Smith 2006), it differs substantially in terms of economic significance, as the 
aforementioned literature finds spillover effect of a magnitude between 0.9% to 2.0%.  
 
 
 
As this might be in part explained by very long streets, such as Prinsengracht with 697 unique 
properties, Keizersgracht with 634 unique properties and Herengracht with 473, in the sample 
Formula (7) (7) (7) (7) (8) (8) (8) (8) (8)
Variable WD WMRS EXKWS INS_Y_BEF WD WMRS EXKWS
INS_t-1 x 
BIG 
STREET 40
INS_t-1 X 
STREET 
EXL BIG 40
Coefficient 0.010168 0.017988 -0.004854 -0.003331 0.010115 0.017953 -0.004876 -0.002149 -0.006882
Std. Error 0.006069 0.010355 0.003265 0.00158 0.006069 0.010355 0.003265 0.001814 0.003109
z-Statistic 1.675436 1.737113 -1.48672 -2.108222 1.666659 1.733735 -1.493458 -1.184743 -2.21388
Prob.  0.0938 0.0824 0.1371 0.035 0.0956 0.083 0.1353 0.2361 0.0268
Weighted Statistics
Mean dependent var -4.11E-07 -4.11E-07
Sum squared resid 2,119 2,119
Akaike info criterion -0.105747 -0.105742
Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.09013 -0.090056
Deviance statistic 0.051461 0.051461
Pearson statistic 0.051461 0.051461
    S.D. dependent var 0.312732 0.312726
    Log likelihood 2,338 2,339
    Schwarz criterion -0.056414 -0.056193
    Deviance 2,041 2,041
    Pearson SSR 2,041 2,041
    Dispersion 0.051461 0.051461
Unweighted Statistics
Mean dependent var -0.014261 -0.014261
    S.D. dependent var 0.297361 0.297361
Table 4: Regression results spillover effects  
Formula 7: ,"# − ,". =  /"# − /". + 0# − 0. + %"#&' − %".&' + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;), with the previously 
described standard terms of formula (2) and the term INS_Y_BEF, which reflects the insolvencies in the same street in 
the previous year (represented in the formula as %"#&' − %".&'). Not reported here are all yearly and monthly dummies, 
as they are control variables.  
Formula 8: ,"# − ,". =  / "# − / ". + 0# − 0. + (%"#&' ∗ +()40+5,"# − %".&' ∗ +()40+5,".) + (%"#&' ∗ =+()40+5,"# −%".&' ∗ =+()40+5,".) + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;), with the previously described terms of formula (8) which is 
complemented by an interaction term for the street size effect included as two dummy for the 40 largest streets [BIG 
STREET 40] (represented in the formula as +()40+5,"# and. −+()40+5,". respectively) and all other streets  [STREET 
EXCL BIG 40] (represented in the formula as =+()40+5,"# and. −=+()40+5,". respectively). Not reported here are all 
yearly and monthly dummies, as they are control variables.  
Both regression results present the result after the Case and Shiller (1987) adjustment for heteroskedasticity. 
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which should decrease spillover effects, as most literature (Hartley 2014; Lin et al. 2009) 
describes spillover effects as a highly local phenomenon. In this sample, which is characterized 
by strong skewness in street sizes, where the average street has 22 unique properties and the 
median street has 5 unique properties, I controlled for the presence of a street size effect via 
the inclusion of 2 interaction variables, which disentangle spillover effects in the 40 largest 
streets and the rest of the streets.  
This inclusion leads to the expected results, as the spillover effect of all streets without the 40 
largest streets, defined by the number of unique properties on the street, increases in terms of 
statistical significance and economic significance from 0.33% to 0.69%, while the spillover 
effect decreases in economic terms for the 40 largest streets alone, from 0.33% to 0.21% and 
loses its statistical significance. 
As this result shows, that the street length significantly impacts the spillover effects, I analyzed 
the impact of increasing street lengths by the inclusion of an interaction variable. The result 
shows that every additional property on a street reduced the negative spillover 0.006%. This  
 
Formula (9) (9) (9) (9) (9)
Variable WD WMRS EXKWS INS_t-1
INS_t-1 x 
Streetsize
Coefficient 0.010577 0.018393 -0.004594 -0.011653 0.0000628
Std. Error 0.006067 0.010352 0.003264 0.002368 0.0000109
z-Statistic 1.743476 1.776703 -1.407477 -4.92149 5.742154
Prob.  0.0813 0.0756 0.1593 0 0
Weighted Statistics
Mean dependent var -4.11E-07
Sum squared resid 2,117
Akaike info criterion -0.106528
Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.090842
Deviance statistic 0.051425
Pearson statistic 0.051425
    S.D. dependent var 0.312665
    Log likelihood 2,355
    Schwarz criterion -0.056979
    Deviance 2,040
    Pearson SSR 2,040
    Dispersion 0.051425
Unweighted Statistics
Mean dependent var -0.014261
    S.D. dependent var 0.297361
Table 4: Regression results spillover effects  
Formula 9: ,"# − ,". =  /"# − /". + 0# − 0. + (%"#&' ∗ +5,-*="# − %".&' ∗ +5,-*=".) + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;), 
with the previously described standard terms of formula (7) and an interaction term between the street size (measured by 
unique properties per street) and foreclosures in the same street in the previous year [INS_t-1 x STREETSIZE] (this 
interaction is represented by %"#&' ∗ +5,-*="# − %".&' ∗ +5,-*=".). Not reported here are all yearly and monthly 
dummies, as they are control variables. Both regression results present the result after the Case and Shiller (1987) 
adjustment for heteroskedasticity. 
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result is highly significant and in line with previous quantitative findings. These results also 
confirm the findings of previous literature (Hartley 2014; Lin et al. 2009) in terms of the 
locality of spillover effects. The high locality is the central argument of Lin et al. (2009) who 
argue that the spillover effect is driven by the inclusion of foreclosed properties in the building 
of a valuation multiple, which raises questions about the prevalent valuation methods during 
the sample period. In order to assess this hypothesis, one would require knowledge about the 
residential real estate valuation methods prevalent during the sample period. While I am not 
aware of literature or knowledge about residential real estate valuation methods during the 
sample period, the second hypothesis that spillover effects are driven by the dis-amenity of 
having vacated or less maintained houses in the neighborhood (Harding et al. 2012) can serve 
as a reasonable explanation for the street size effect. As Hartley (2014) identified that the effect 
arising from the dis-amenity of having foreclosed properties in the neighborhood is close to 
zero, while large parts of spillover effects can be explained changes in the local supply of 
properties, this hypothesis is tested by analyzing the time variation of spillover effects. Here 
one should expect larger spillover effects in times of lower demand, hence in the second phase 
of the sample, as the impact of increasing supply should be larger when the market is not 
characterized by a demand overhang. As the sample incorporates multiple times of crises, I 
expect the spillover effect to be the largest in these times. That would also be in line with the 
findings of Li (2017) who finds time variation in spillover effects and finds a negative relation 
between spillover effects and the price development in the market. 
 
The results show that spillover effects have not been significant over the full time-period, this 
lack of statistical significance is also reflected in the economic magnitude of 0.006% in the 
period from 1651 to 1700 and 0.6% in the period from 1601 till 1650. After this period one can 
find two time periods with negative spillover effects that are significant and one time period 
with positive spillover effects. The periods from 1701 till 1750 and 1801 till 1811, with a 
negative coefficient of 0.7% and 0.9% respectively, are significant. Both periods can be 
characterized by a prevailing recession, which in the time period from 1701 till 1750 ended in 
a residential real estate crisis with a high amount of foreclosure sales but interestingly the 
period up to that that crisis is characterized by a relatively low share of insolvency transactions 
with an average of 7% compared to 19% over the total sample period. This characteristic can 
also be found in the time period from 1801 until 1811 where the average share of insolvency 
transactions per year is 8%. 
 
42 
 
 
Another interesting similarity between both time periods is that they incorporate periods of 
declining housing market prices, in the time period between 1701 until 1750, one can see 
consistently falling prices from 1736 until 1750 and in the time period from 1801 till 1811 we 
can see that the median price decreased from 1950 Gulden in 1801 to 1315 Gulden in 1810 
which represents a price decrease of 32%. While the decreasing prices might be an explanation 
for the increased spillover effects, which would be in line with the findings of Li (2017) and 
the findings of Hartley (2014) when assuming that the change in supply effectuates a change 
in price. When looking at the overall house price development one might wonder why the 
period of 1751 until 1800 has a highly insignificant coefficient for spillover effects. Here my 
hypothesis is that the time following 1750 with rising residential real estate prices, due to the 
economic recovery described by de Vries and van der Woude (2007), cause this insignificance. 
This would mean that the rising prices in that early part of the time period dominate the 
decreasing prices induced by the consequences of the declaration of the fourth Anglo-Dutch 
war in 1780 and the connected economic crisis which result into the price development from 
Formula (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10)
Variable WD WMRS EXKWS
1601-1650 x 
INS_t-1
1651-1700 
x INS_t-1
1701-1750 x 
INS_t-1
1751-1800 x 
INS_t-1
1801-1811 x 
INS_t-1
Coefficient 0.010222 0.017614 -0.004857 -0.006051 -0.0000643 -0.007465 0.001194 -0.009489
Std. Error 0.00607 0.010357 0.003265 0.009893 0.00275 0.002761 0.003205 0.004497
z-Statistic 1.684181 1.700577 -1.487559 -0.61168 -0.023386 -2.704155 0.372609 -2.109881
Prob.  0.0921 0.089 0.1369 0.5407 0.9813 0.0068 0.7094 0.0349
Weighted Statistics
Mean dependent var -4.11E-07
Sum squared resid 2,118
Akaike info criterion -0.105746
Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.089856
Deviance statistic 0.05146
Pearson statistic 0.05146
    S.D. dependent var 0.312683
    Log likelihood 2,342
    Schwarz criterion -0.055551
    Deviance 2,041
    Pearson SSR 2,041
    Dispersion 0.05146
Unweighted Statistics
Mean dependent var -0.014261
    S.D. dependent var 0.297361
Table 5: Regression results time-variation of spillover effects  
Formula 10: ,"# − ,". =  / "# − / ". +  0# −0. + (%"#&' ∗ 5# − %".&' ∗ 5.) + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;), with the 
previously described standard terms of formula (7) and an interaction term between the different time periods and 
foreclosures in the same street in the previous year (this interaction is represented in the formula by %"#&' ∗ 5# − %".&' ∗5.). Not reported here are all yearly and monthly dummies, as they are control variables. The regression results present 
the result after the Case and Shiller (1987) adjustment for heteroskedasticity. 
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1801 till 1811. Summarizing I believe that the described in-period development causes of 
suppression of spillover effect by the strong price increase over the majority of the time period. 
In total, the results imply that the change in supply and hence the impact on the overall supply-
demand relationship seem to drive the price more than the dis-amenity of having foreclosed 
properties in the neighborhood as the dis-amenity of foreclosed properties should be 
independent of the general price development in the residential real estate market. 
 
In order to reflect the definition of Kallberg et al. (2014) another analysis of the time variation 
of spillover effects was done, the authors define spillover effects as the co-movement of prices 
that are not attributable to a change in fundamental factors. To reflect that definition the 
residuals of the Case-Shiller adjusted formula (2) were taken as a dependent variable and 
regressed on the change of insolvencies on street level in the years preceding the transaction 
interacting with the previously defined time periods in a 2-step estimation procedure.  
 
The results of this regression are congruent in terms of time period significance but differ in 
terms of economic magnitude, which means that the initial OLS regression is not affected by 
Dependent Variable: RESIDUAL_CS_BASE
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/20/18   Time: 23:17
Sample: 1 39892
Included observations: 39892
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
1601-1650 x INS_t-1 -0.000316 0.009571 -0.033045 0.9736
1651-1700 x INS_t-1 0.001723 0.002547 0.676416 0.4988
1701-1750 x INS_t-1 -0.006825 0.002625 -2.599869 0.0093
1751-1800 x INS_t-1 -2.05E-04 0.003143 -0.065214 0.948
1801-1811 x INS_t-1 -0.01465 0.004293 -3.412561 0.0006
C 0.008877 0.001166 7.611015 0
R-squared 0.000479     Mean dependent var 0.00853
Adjusted R-squared0.000354     S.D. dependent var 0.230337
S.E. of regression 0.230296     Akaike info criterion -0.09875
Sum squared resid2115.408     Schwarz criterion -0.097458
Log likelihood 1975.673     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.098341
F-statistic 3.826447     Durbin-Watson stat 2.156876
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001819
Table 6: Regression results spillover effects in residuals 
Formula 2: ,"# − ,". =  /"# − /". + 0# − 0. + 1"# − 1"., 3 < 5, 1~7(0, :;), which residuals were the dependent 
variable in: 
Formula 12: 1 = (%"#&' ∗ 5# − %".&' ∗ 5.) + . + 1"# − 1". , with an interaction term for different time periods and 
foreclosures in the same street in the previous year (this interaction is represented in the formula by %"#&' ∗ 5# − %".&' ∗5.). The regression results present the result after the Case and Shiller (1987) adjustment for heteroskedasticity. 
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potential endogeneity. While the inclusion in the repeat sales regression leads to a spillover 
effect of 0.95% for the time period from 1801 until 1811 the regression on the residuals leads 
to a result of 1.46%, while the economic magnitude is 0.1% lower in the time period from 1701 
till 1751. Apart from that deviation the regression confirms the previously identified results.  
The significant spillover effects might also explain the recognized investor behavior when 
looking at the crisis from 1743 to 1751. In this time one could see that the most advanced real 
estate investors, measured by the number of transactions, did not enter into foreclosure sale 
transactions but purchased properties via normal transactions mostly before the crisis. If they 
were active in the crisis they mainly purchased via normal transactions. This makes sense when 
assuming the existence of significant spillover effects of foreclosed properties on normal 
properties because under the assumption that foreclosure discounts might arise from either lack 
of maintenance, procedural uncertainty or changed supply-demand relationships, buying 
properties that are not exposed to these risks at a discount makes intuitive sense. 
8. Discussion and contextualization of results 
 
Overall the results do imply that the residential real estate market of Amsterdam during the 
sample period can be characterized as very efficient. A consistent foreclosure discount cannot 
be identified over the sample period, which can most likely be explained by a large demand 
overhang due to the strongly increasing population (de Vries and van der Woude 2007) and the 
associated price increases, these lead to decreasing foreclosure discounts as described by Zhou 
et al. (2015). As the analysis of combinations involving foreclosure sales revealed that houses 
bought via foreclosure sales and sold via normal sales realize lower returns than a return which 
is realized via two normal sales. This leads to two possible explanations, either the foreclosed 
properties are bought at a premium or properties that are bought via foreclosure sales 
experience lower than average price appreciations. Under the first explanation properties that 
are bought via normal sale and sold via foreclosure sale should realize a significant premium 
too. As this is not the case the second explanation seems to be more likely, hence one can 
assume that the quality of foreclosed properties is lower than average, which would mean that 
a significant foreclosure discount does not represent a market inefficiency but just the result of 
an appropriate pricing of fundamental differences, this is also in line with previous research 
that finds that foreclosure discounts are negatively correlated to the quality of the underlying 
property Zhou et al. (2015). In addition to that foreclosure discounts also seem to reflect the 
current market dynamics of demand and supply as the
45 
 
in prices, usually associated with overhanging demand. As the strong population increase 
should lead to a significant demand overhang, which can be also seen in the price development 
the occurrence of significant foreclosure discounts only in times of crisis does not seem 
surprising. I assume that in periods of demand overhangs, the accessibility of residential real 
estate dominates the pricing considerations as supply is limited, while in times of more 
available supply the pricing of secondary factors such as the presumed lower quality, most 
likely induced by a lack of maintenance, gets priced in. In terms of economic magnitude the 
results are in line with the results of Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009), who argued that 
foreclosure discounts of 20% and above are counterintuitive under the assumption of efficient 
markets, as the identified foreclosure discounts in times of crisis are 2.7% and 3.5%, which 
seems to support the assumption of efficient real estate markets in Amsterdam during the 
sample period. 
 
The identified spillover seem to be driven by changes in supply, as they are highly time variant 
and occur mainly in periods of crisis where the demand is decreased and the supply is increased, 
this is in line with the findings of previous literature (Hartley 2014) and the demand and supply 
characteristics of the sample period.  
 
To summarize one can say that the hypothesis of a continuous presence of foreclosure discounts 
over the full sample period cannot be confirmed, most likely due to the sample-specific demand 
and supply profile. Opposed to that the presence of time-varying foreclosure discounts in 
combination with the hypothesis of increasing foreclosure discounts in times of residential 
estate market crisis is confirmed in the sample.  
The presence of significant spillover effects in the sample is confirmed as well, but also the 
spillover effect is time variant and occurs mainly in times of crisis.  
 
9. Limitations, Future Research & Conclusion 
 
This section will start with an analysis of the limitations of the research conducted in this thesis 
and continue with identifying the need or potential for future research and ends with a 
conclusion. 
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9.1. Limitations 
 
This thesis investigated the residential real estate market of Amsterdam from the 16th to the 
19th century and is identifying the presence of foreclosure discounts and spillover effects. This 
provides new insights into the market efficiency of historic residential real estate markets and 
the dynamics of foreclosure discounts and spillover effects.  
While these insights represent an interesting basis for future research, I acknowledge the strong 
impact limitations of this research. This is driven by the strong local focus on Amsterdam 
during a time period, which is not only timewise very distant to today but also in terms of 
fundamental market characteristics an uncommon sample. The period is dominated by a strong 
inhabitant increase in Amsterdam (van der Woude 1982), which significantly influences 
demand and supply dynamics.  This effect is balanced by the length of the time period which 
should counteract the sample-specific strong demand overhang by the inclusion of several 
residential real estate market crises. While the sample in total reflects several real estate and 
economic cycles, the period and aerial limitation restrict the impact of the results due to limited 
generalizability of the results. 
In addition to that, the research shows limitations arising from the research design. While the 
research design allows measuring foreclosure discounts and spillover effects the explanation 
remains highly indicative and is based on descriptive statistics and correlations. The first 
attempt to explain foreclosure discounts quantitatively did not result in statistically significant 
results, limits the here provided explanations to indicative explanations of the results, that are 
subject to further research. While these indicative explanations present, due to the time 
limitations in this thesis, the best way to analyze and explain the results of this thesis, they 
result in a limited usability of the provided explanations.  
Next, to that, the hypothesis of delayed maintenance in combination with changes in the supply 
and demand relation as central drivers of foreclosure discounts is limited by the chosen 
methodology of repeat-sales regressions. As the data set does not include information about 
the maintenance status of the transacted property the assumption of constant quality 
characteristics might be flawed, due to the fact that delayed maintenance is likely to cause 
deteriorating quality over time. 
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9.2. Future research 
 
The sample presents a unique opportunity to gain deeper knowledge about historic real estate 
markets. In order to learn more about the real estate market one should investigate the drivers 
of the time variation in foreclosure discounts and the time variation of the spillover effect 
because when the drivers of the time variation are understood, important conclusions can be 
made on the mechanics of foreclosure discounts today. Here the analysis of drivers of 
foreclosure discounts seems to be of central importance, especially the quantification of 
impacts of possible delayed maintenance and changes in supply and demand relations should 
be further researched, as the results in this thesis are subject to several limitations as described 
in the previous chapter. 
As I have identified that spillover effects are driven by street sizes and hence seem to be a very 
local effect, identifying the exact location of the properties in the sample to run further analysis 
on spillover effects seems to offer interesting insights for future research, as an exact location 
would not only allow increasing the precision when determining the locality of effects but 
would also allow analyzing market dynamics in different neighborhoods. The identification of 
different neighborhoods would allow verifying previously found characteristics of spillover 
effects and foreclosure discounts. As previous literature suggests that spillover effects are a 
highly local phenomenon, hence the research design using streets to identify the location of 
individual properties, does not seem to be an ideal solution, the already identified significant 
spillover effects might increase in terms of economic and statistical significance when 
increasing the ability to localize properties. 
 
In addition to that the extensive dataset should be used to gain deeper knowledge of the 
interaction between credit markets and the real estate market, as the sample presents a unique 
opportunity to use a detailed dataset, which covers a long time period and can be complemented 
by additional publicly available data sources, this should allow conducting research explaining 
the dynamics between the credit market, the residential real estate market and foreclosure 
discounts. In particular, the time variation should be further investigated, as this allows to draw 
conclusions about the drivers of foreclosure discounts and spillover effects and give 
recommendations how to improve market efficiencies to avoid the negative economic 
externalities of foreclosure discounts and associated spillover effects. 
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The sample offers the opportunity to learn more about the influence of financial markets on 
real estate markets, as the sample period, covers the emergence of the stock exchanges and the 
emergence of several financial markets and products. The extensive documentation duties of 
the time period give interesting insights into how financial markets influenced the real estate 
markets and foreclosure discounts as the sample allows to have parts of the sample without the 
impact of financial products and hence disentangle the effect of financial markets in a way 
which is not possible for a more recent dataset.  
 
9.3. Conclusion 
 
This thesis uses a repeat sales methodology to assess the market efficiency in the residential 
real estate market of Amsterdam in the golden ages using a unique data set collected by the 
City Archives of Amsterdam. This analysis is the first analysis using a cross-methodological 
approach on historical data to enhance the understanding of the pricing dynamics resulting 
from foreclosure processes in the residential real estate market. It finds time-varying 
foreclosure discounts and significant negative spillover effects of foreclosing properties in the 
neighborhood. 
 
Despite the presented limitations and the corresponding need for additional research, this thesis 
has interesting implications for several streams of literature. In a historical context the finding 
of no significant foreclosure discounts over the full sample are an interesting finding, as it 
implies high efficiency of the residential real estate market of Amsterdam in the golden ages 
and hence indicates that future research of the structuring of the foreclosure processes in 
Amsterdam in the golden ages to identify optimization potential for the current foreclosure 
processes. The time variance of foreclosure discounts which has been found in the sample is in 
line with previous research (Zhou et al. 2015) and seems to be negatively correlated with the 
house price appreciation in the total residential real estate market. The corresponding 
regression does not result in statically significant coefficients but the positive interaction 
coefficient between the price level and the foreclosure discount seem to give a positive 
indication for this theory. A second regression, which analyzed the combinations of sales 
extending the basic repeat sales methodology showed that houses which were first sold via a 
foreclosure process and then in a normal process realized lower returns than houses that were 
sold in the first and the second transaction via normal sales procedures. In combination with 
an analysis of individual investor behavior, this analysis of foreclosure combinations led to the 
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explanation that these foreclosure discounts are most likely reflective of the lower quality or 
maintenance status of foreclosed properties. These seem to be only secondary as a pricing 
factor in times of excess demand but become significant for the price determination in times of 
limited demand, for example in times economic crises, which not only limit demand but also 
create additional supply. While this explanation is in line with the research and hypothesis of 
Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009) and Sumell (2009), it is also confirmed by the fact that the 
combination where the house is purchased via normal sales procedure and sold via foreclosure 
sale does not generate a premium, hence the discount in the first combination does not seem to 
be driven from a premium when acquiring foreclosed properties but from a discount in the 
sales process when the property is sold in a normal process. Hence the argument that in efficient 
markets foreclosure discounts represent an arbitrage opportunity (Harding et al. 2012) should 
be questioned, because when the foreclosure discount is a function of the current relationship 
between demand and supply, as suggested by the link found by  Zhou et al. (2015) via 
identifying the link between foreclosure discounts and price and the quality of the homes, 
foreclosure discounts do not represent an arbitrage opportunity but are a consequence of the 
fundamentals of the property and the prevalent market conditions. This market and 
fundamental based explanation seems to be also reflected in the economic magnitude of the 
identified in this thesis of 2.7% and 3.5%, that is in line with the argumentation of Clauretie 
and Daneshvary (2009), which oppose large parts of previous research and state that 
foreclosure discounts of 20% seem counterintuitive under the assumption of efficient markets. 
This is confirmed by the statistical results of this thesis. 
 
When analyzing spillover effects during the sample period, the analysis identified spillover 
effects are of economic [-0.3%] and statistical significance despite the limitations resulting 
from the research design. This is confirmed when controlling for the effect of long streets on 
the economic and statistical significance of the results, here one can see that the 40 largest 
streets in the sample show no significant spillover effect. In a second analysis, where I interact 
spillover effects with absolute street sizes, I find that the spillover effect is reduced by 0.006% 
per additional property in the same street. This does not only confirm the limitations of the 
research methodology but also confirms that spillover effects had in the historic setting the 
same characteristic of high locality. Analyzing the time variation of such spillover effects 
confirmed the findings of Li (2017), who finds larger spillover effects in times of depreciating 
housing markets. This time variation and also implies that the results of Hartley (2014), who 
finds that spillover effects are driven by changes in supply rather than by the dis-amenity of 
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having bad quality properties in the neighborhood, are applicable to the residential real estate 
market of Amsterdam during the sample period too, as a dis-amenity driven effect should be 
present over the full sample period. The last explanation that spillover effects can be explained 
by the inclusion of neighboring properties in the neighborhood (Lin et al. 2009), seems to have 
become more questionable, as this would imply that the valuation of properties has been 
conducted via the multiple-method during the golden ages in Amsterdam and to my best 
knowledge we do not have any information about real estate appraisal methods during that time 
available, hence this subject remains to be further researched. 
 
Overall this thesis offers interesting insights into the market efficiency of real estate markets 
of Amsterdam during the golden ages, it adds several arguments to the current discussion of 
foreclosure discounts and their classification as arbitrage opportunity or efficient pricing 
mechanism and identifies the existence of spillover effects in a historical market setting. The 
central argument of that thesis is that the phenomenon of foreclosure discounts seem to be 
mainly a consequence of inherent market dynamics and individual housing characteristics. The 
same is valid for spillover effects that seem to be driven by market-related supply and demand 
dynamics rather than by negative externalities of neighboring properties that are foreclosed.  
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Example of transcribed data entry 
Transcribed example of an ordinaris kwijtschelding, which formed the largest share of the 
underlying data. This transcription was done by Korevaar (2018) and stems from the Property 
transfer act ACA 5065, inv. Nr. 45, 195f.. It describes a transaction of Rembrandt Hermansz 
in the standardized form. 
“We,  Cornelis van Vlooswijck and Gerrit van Hellemont, aldermen in Amsterdam,  
write and acknowledge that for us have appeared Christoffel Thys and  Jan Beltens as 
heirs of Pieter Beltens de Jonge, and  have  sold  and remitted to Rembrandt Hermansz 
a house and yard standing on the Breestraat, over the Sint Anthonis sluice, on the west-
side, with a free exit or pass-through to the house of Claes Elias, as has been explained  
in the acts of remittance about those, and this being the house and yard that is or was  
next to that of Claes Elias, with the entire wall on the north west side and that of 
Salvador Rodrigues on the south east side, and reaches from the street until the house 
and yard that belongs to Bastiaen Jacobsz Kistemaecker. And those that have  appeared 
have already committed to the terms, and the principal has brought Isaac van Beecq  
and Dirck Dircks Grijp (jointly appeared) as joint guarantors, and  each  has promised  
with all their movable property that this house and yard has and will be remitted year  
and day, as one has promised to do, and to remove older acts. This is what the sellers 
have each promised, and the principal has also promised  to  keep  the  guarantors free 
from losses under the agreements written above. Entered January 8,  1653.” 
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Appendix B: Summary statistics of the most relevant variables 
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